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THE ACT OF STATE-FOREIGN DECISIONS
CITED IN THE SABBATINO CASE: A
REBUTTAL AND MEMORANDUM
OF LAW
WILLIAM HARVEY REEVES*
I. INTRODUCTION
Socrates: And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose, for
example, that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number; do
differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one
another? Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them
by a sum?
Euthyphro: True.
Socrates: Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quicdly end the
difference by measuring?
Euthyphro: Very true.
Socrates: And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a weigh-
ing machine?
Euthyphro: To be sure.'
IF we apply this Socratic admonition to the foreign cases cited in the
opinions of the three United States courts in Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatiho, it will be found that one,' and only one, of all the foreign
cases cited, as bearing upon the act of state doctrine, supported an
exception to that doctrine.4 All other foreign cases cited not reversed or
nationally repudiated, in which the issue arose, recognized the validity
of a fully executed act of a foreign state even if that act was found to
be contrary to international law. Thus, contrary to what appears to be
popular opinion in the United States, if the lower courts' opinions in
Sabbatino had been sustained, or if for other reasons that decision should
* Member of the New York Bar. Acknowledgment is made to Wlliam IL Buchanan, Jr.,
Esq., for useful research in the preparation of this article.
1. 2 Dialogues of Plato 31 (3d ed. Jowett 1S92).
2. 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rcv'd, 376 US.
398 (1964).
3. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate (The Rose Mary), [1953] 1 Weekly L.R. 246, [1953]
Int'l L. Rep. 316 (Sup. Ct. Aden), Appendix p. 621 infra,
4. The phrase "act of state" has a well-defined meaning in United States jurisprudence.
The le-al principles connoted in this phrase and the phrase "act of state doctrine" are well
known also in foreign countries, but not always with these designations. For other meanings
sometimes found in foreign writings and foreign decisions, see Katz & Brewster, International
Transactions and Relations 108-09 (1960). The phrases will be used throughout this article
to mean the principles indicated by those phrases as understood in United States juris-
prudence.
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become a rule of decision in the United States, the United States would be
alone among the great trading nations of the world in its refusal to recog-
nize as valid the acts of state of another country for any reason whatso-
ever.
Before we begin to count-measure-weigh these cases, it is wise first
to review briefly the Sabbatino case and the decisions of the three United
States courts, as each refers to the act of state doctrine.
II. BRIEF REVIEW OF THE Sabbatino CASE RELATING
TO THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
In the Sabbatino case the facts were: two parties each claimed the
right to receive a sum of money which was under the control of the court.
The money was the contract purchase price for a shipload of sugar. To
whom it should be paid depended upon who had held title to the sugar
when it was shipped from Cuba on the order of the purchaser. There
was but one purchaser, and he was willing to pay-in fact he had paid;
but to whom should the money be awarded by the court? To the Amer-
ican-owned, Cuban-incorporated sugar company which had produced the
sugar? Or to the representative of Castro's Cuban Government which
had nationalized that company and seized its assets in Cuba? The title
was determined by decision of the issues whether the nationalization law
of Cuba was valid or invalid, and whether the nationalization law and
seizures under it-the act of state-transferred title or did not transfer
title from the sugar company to the Cuban Government. Should the
national act of Cuba be ignored and the case decided as though the act
of state had not occurred? The validity or invalidity of an act of state
within a country's own national domain was the principal question of
law; the facts were undisputed.
All the United States courts recognized that the issue in the Sabbatino
case was the definition, interpretation, and application of the act of state
doctrine.
The question which brought this case here, and is now found to be the dispositive
issue, is whether the so-called act of state doctrine serves to sustain petitioner's claims
(based on title) in this litigation. 5
All the courts understood the act of state doctrine. The court of appeals
defined it as follows:
The Act of State Doctrine, briefly stated, holds that American courts will not pass
on the validity of the acts of foreign governments performed in their capacities as
sovereigns within their own territories.6
5. 376 U.S. at 400. (Parentheses added.)
6. 307 F.2d at 855.
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In spite of the lower courts' interpretation, all three courts cited-, Mr.
Justice Fuller's opinion in Underhill v. Hernandez' as indicative of the
attitude the United States had previously taken, and two courts?
quoted it:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
State, and the courts of one country xill not sit in judgment on the acts of the gov-
ernment of another done within its ovm territory.' 0
All the courts found (or did not deny) the Cuban act of state to have
been fully executed in Cuba on the property of which the purchase price
was in controversy. All found that the Cuban Government had been
recognized by the United States; that the national intention of Cuba as
to the property in question was fully expressed by legislation; that exe-
cution of the intention was by Cuba's seizure of the property (the sugar)
in Cuba and the sale of that sugar by an agency of the Cuban Govern-
ment; that possession of the property was relinquished only on the order
of a buyer who by a sales contract had agreed to pay for it, thereby
admitting for himself that the seller, an agency of Cuba, had title. All
United States courts agreed or assumed that there was no redress in the
courts of Cuba."
The district court found that adherence to the act of state doctrine
was a limitation on the courts, a limitation which sometimes actually
prevented a United States court from rendering justice in a particular
case; that United States courts should, therefore, be free to declare a
foreign act of state, which the court finds to be in contravention of inter-
national law, invalid and to make decisions as though the foreign state
had not committed such an act within its own territory.' The court of
appeals" agreed with the district court, as did Mr. Justice White, the
one dissenting justice of the Supreme Court.'
The Supreme Court reversed both lower courts and affirmed adherence
by the United States to the act of state doctrine. Of the three courts,
only the Supreme Court, in the final decision on this issue, found that
7. 376 U.S. at 416; id. at 442 n.2 ('White, J., dissenting); 307 F.2d at S56; 193 F.
Supp. at 330.
S. 16S U.S. 250 (1897).
9. 376 U.S. at 416; 307 F.2d at 356.
10. Underhill v. Hernandez, 16S U.S. at 252.
11. The Cuban confiscatory decrees did not permit accezs to Cuban courts. Lawv of
Nationalization No. 851, art. 6, July 6, 1960 provided: "The rezolutions jointly iucd by
the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic in the forced e'propriation proceed-
ings instituted hereunder may not be appealed, as no remedial action -hall be available
thereagainst."
12. 193 F. Supp. at 331.
13. 307 F.2d at S60-61.
14. 376 U.S. at 439 (White, J., dissenting).
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the Cuban act of state was valid in Cuba, that title had been transferred
in Cuba from the sugar company to the Government of Cuba, and that
in the United States the effect on that property must be recognized.
The decision of the Supreme Court, in which eight justices concurred
(one dissented with an opinion), has not settled the matter. Just a few
months after the decision of the Supreme Court, a rider 0 (known as the
"Hickenlooper Amendment") was added in the United States Senate to
the foreign assistance bill pending before Congress.'" The purpose of this
rider, as frankly stated by its proponents, was to overrule the decision
of the Supreme Court in Sabbatino.17 In the memorandum submitted in
support of the rider, the full opinion of Mr. Justice White was ap-
pended; the majority opinion was not included.' There was little pub-
licity and there were no public hearings, but the rider became law'" with
the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964.20 By its terms the
provisions of the rider apply only to cases prior to January 1, 1966.
Congress, therefore, must consider renewal, termination or modification.
The full text of this rider may be found on page 670 of the Appendix
to this article.
III. To COUNT, TO MEASURE, AND TO WEIGH
To determine what foreign courts do when faced with a foreign act
of state contrary to international law, we need only to count, measure,
and weigh the foreign cases, as referring to a foreign act of state, cited
by the three United States courts in the Sabbatino case.,2
To Count. Thirty-two22 of these foreign cases were cited by the three
United States courts. These comprise one or more decisions of courts of
the following countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Great
Britain, Greece, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Singapore (formerly in
the British Straits Settlements), and the then British Protectorate of
Aden.
To Measure. Most of these decisions were in civil law jurisdictions,
15. 110 Cong. Rec. 18935 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1964).
16. H.R. 11380, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
17. 110 Cong. Rec. 18935 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1964).
18. 110 Cong. Rec. 18937-43 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1964).
19. 78 Stat. 1013 (1964), 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370(e) (2) (Supp. 1964).
20. 78 Stat. 1009 (codified in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.A.).
21. Some foreign cases were cited in the opinions in Sabbatino for propositions of law
other than the act of state doctrine. In the survey of the cases only foreign cases cited for
that proposition of law are reviewed. Not all of the foreign cases relating to foreign acts of
state were cited to show that foreign courts always refused to recognize the validity of a
foreign act of state violative of international law. Some were evidently included for com-
parison. However, all cases cited on this question are surveyed in the Appendix.
22. For discussion of these cases, see Appendix infra.
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Aden, England and Singapore being the only ones which adhere to
common-law procedures.
All countries approach legal problems in their own peculiar manner
and seek to arrive at a standard of justice, though by different procedures.
We must, therefore, have a common denominator-a measuring rod-to
apply to these foreign cases. Let our standard of measurement be this:
if the facts in each foreign case had been presented to a United States
court, would that United States court under United States procedure and
in support of the act of state doctrine have come to the same legal con-
clusion as did the foreign courts?
Our means of measurement cannot be complete unless we define what
is necessary to create an act of state as that phrase is defined in United
States law and used by United States courts. The Supreme Court said
in the Sabbatino case that any foreign act of state to be recognized as
valid in the United States must be an executed one.23 Therefore, one need
know what conditions must be met (a) to create a valid act of state, and
(b) to execute an act of state on persons and property within a foreign
country. These conditions are readily found in decided cases in United
States courts.
1. Only an established government can create a valid act of state. Political recog-
nition of a foreign government by the United States Department of State is sufficient
to prove that the foreign government is capable of creating such an act. Also, if a
foreign government has been firmly established, a de facto government not recog-
nized de jure, a United States court may in its discretion decide that that government is
capable of making a valid act of state.2 4
2. As a corollary to the above, the acts of state of a foreign revolutionary govern-
ment, committed prior to recognition, are recognized as valid, after recognition of
the government, in respect to any controversies which may be adjudicated after recog-
nition, provided, however, possession and control of the property whose title is in
question have been retained by the foreign country or by one claiming title under a
retroactively recognized act of state of that country.23
3. An act of state has no extra-territorial effect. Each sovereign state can determine
for itself as to property which has been solely within its own jurisdiction whether
the act of state of another country will be permitted to affect such property. Thus,
if an act of state of a foreign country is incompatible vith the laws of the United
States, such an act will affect such property in the United States only by a treaty
or executive agreement for this purpose.26
4. When a claim is made that property entering the United States has been sub-
23. The decision of each court found that Cuba had physical posesion of the sugar.
See 376 U.S. at 413 & n.14.
24. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302-03 (1913); Underhill v. Hernandez,
168 U.S. 250, 253-54 (1897); see Luther v. James Sagor & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 532 (CA.),
Appendix p. 632 infra.
25. Ibid.
26. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). See also Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 5S9-90 (1839).
1965]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
jected to a foreign act of state which was in violation of international law, the United
States will recognize the intended effect only if that property had been subjected
abroad to a fully executed act of state. For a foreign country to execute an act of state,
that country must have both jurisdiction over and possession of the property to be
affected. 27
5. Recognition of the validity of an act of state of a foreign country and the effect
of its execution on property brought into the United States is not approval of the
act, nor admission of its fairness, nor declaration that it conforms to the standards of
international law. Furthermore, recognition of the validity and effect of a foreign fully-
executed act of state does not relieve the foreign country committing the act from
liability for loss or damage caused by the national act.2 8
With this measure-this yardstick-let us then consider the facts and
the decisions of each of these thirty-two cases cited by the three United
States courts in Sabbatino2
To Weigh. To weigh any decision, foreign or domestic, is to state the
salient facts which were before the court, the basis of the controversy
and the reasons for the decision; then to apply the measure.
The complete result of this "weighing" is collected in an Appendix to
this article where each case is reviewed in detail. Wherever the statement
of the case appears to have been adequate in the digests published in the
International Law Reports or the Annual Digest, these sources have
been used. But a number of these cases are not included in these digests
of international cases, and in a few other instances the facts given in
the digest are not sufficiently complete to make a final determination as
to the significance of the case and the decision on the question of a for-
eign act of state. Thus, where necessary, reference has been made to the
27. Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 240 (1808); see Appendix pp. 640-48 infra,
regarding the French and Greek cases cited in the Sabbatino decisions.
28. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
29. For more extended considerations of the act of state doctrine in United States juris-
prudence, see Reeves, The Sabbatino Case: The Supreme Court of the United States Rejects
a Proposed New Theory of Sovereign Relations and Restores the Act of State Doctrine,
32 Fordham L. Rev. 631 (1964).
An English definition of act of state may be found in In re Helbert Wagg & Co., [1956)
Ch. 323, 344-45: "I start with the elementary proposition that it is part of the law of
England, and of most nations, that in general every civilized State must be recognized as
having power to legislate in respect of movables situate within that State and in respect of
contracts governed by the law of that State, and that such legislation must be recognized by
other States as valid and effectual to alter title to such movables and to sustain, modify or
dissolve such contracts. The substantial question I have to determine is what limit is to be
imposed upon that proposition when the effect of such legislation comes to be debated in
the courts of other States. I may note in passing that the modern tendency is to deny
extraterritorial validity to legislation, for example, upon movables situate outside the State
at the time of the legislation .... "
The United States Supreme Court found that the English view of the act of state doctrine
was similar to that of the United States. 376 U.S. at 421 n.21. The United States Court of
Appeals also found that England had followed the act of state doctrine. 307 F.2d at 855 n.6.
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original decision either in the law reports of the country, or in a legal
journal if the decision itself was never officially published. In the Appen-
dix to this article, the source of the information as to each case is given
with appropriate citations and, where necessary by way of explanation
and comparison, there are comments and references to United States
policy and law or to decisions of the United States courts. Preceding this
Appendix, the thirty-two cases are listed and indexed in two different
ways for ready reference: first, under the page number in the Appendix
where the review of each case is to be found; and second, under the
name of the country in whose court the particular case was decided.
By a review of the foreign cases, the lower courts' reliance on sundry
untenable premises becomes apparent.
IV. PREMISES ACCEPTED BY THE LOWER COURTS IN
THE Sabbatino DECISIONS
The lower courts relied erroneously on the
PREMISE: That the courts of foreign countries are free to declare and frequentlyhave declared the act of state ojf another country to be null and void and ineffectve
vithin that country whe-n they find such act of state to be contrary to intcrnational law.
Of the thirty-two cases cited, with the exception of an unappealed
decision of a local court,o every case not overruled by a higher court or
nationally repudiated, in which the issue is squarely met, can be cited
as authority for the Supreme Court's decision in the Sabbatino case;
there is no exception to the act of state doctrine. Thus these foreign cases
are similar and wholly consistent with decisions of our own courts from
the inception of the Republic to the decision of the district court in
Sabbatino.
But the premise that foreign courts do not recognize the validity of
foreign acts of state if contrary to international law is not the only
erroneous premise to be found within the two lower court opinions. Some
others may briefly be mentioned:
PREMISE: That no sovereign has the power to create a valid act of
state which is contrary to internatioYal law.-There is no doubt that this
is what the district court and the court of appeals said and held in
Sabbatino. The district court said: "There is an end to the right of
national sovereignty when the sovereign's acts impinge on international
30. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate (The Rose Mary) [1953] 1 Weekly L.R. 246, [1953]
Int'l L. Rep. 316 (Sup. Ct. Aden), Appendix p. 621 infra. (Note: The case of the Confvcation
of Property of Sudeten Germans has sometimes been cited as authority that, under German
law, German courts refuse to recognize the validity of foreign acts of state which (a) are
contrary to international law and (b) are not in accord with German public order. For
reasons why this case is not authority or precedent for any principle of German law, se
Appendix pp. 663-67 infra.)
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law." 1 The court of appeals stated: "[T]he very proposition that some-
thing known as international law exists carries with it the implication
that national sovereignty is not absolute but is limited, where the inter-
national law impinges, by the dictates of this international law." 2 This,
were it true, denies the sovereign power of the United States, reverses
many United States courts' decisions, amends the Constitution of the
United States and establishes a sort of world federation, setting a prece-
dent under which any court of any country in the world may declare any
act of the United States Congress to be null and void and interfere with
United States trade on the basis of such a decision. The power of any
sovereign-the power of the United States-extends to the making and
enforcing within its own territory any law it pleases, whether or not any
other foreign sovereign power considers that law to be contrary to inter-
national law. "Law is a statement of the circumstances in which the
public force will be brought to bear upon men [and property] through
the courts."3 "The very meaning of sovereignty is that the decree of the
sovereign makes law."
'34
Many times in the history of the United States foreign countries have
declared acts of the United States to be contrary to international law,
including England's denunciation of the Monroe Doctrine: "In our opin-
ion, the doctrine propounded in this dispatch is absolutely incompatible
with international law."35 The following quotations clearly demonstrate
31. 193 F. Supp. at 381.
32. 307 F.2d at 860.
33. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
34. Id. at 358.
35. Law Officers Report 120 (Gr. Brit. 1895), reprinted in The Foreign Office Confi-
dential Print Series (now available in some public libraries).
This statement was prompted by United States insistence, in 1895, that the Monroe Doctrine
required arbitration of a dispute (to which the United States made itself a party) between
Great Britain and Venezuela as to the fixation of the boundary between British Guiana and
Great Britain. Although this contention was at first rejected, the dispute was settled by
arbitration in 1899. See generally 6 Moore, Digest of International Law § 966 (1906).
Very recently, the District Court of Rotterdam held that the action by the United States
Government in vesting certain property in the United States, under the Trading with the
enemy act, 40 Stat. 416 (1917), as amended, 50 U.S.C. app. § 7 (1958), was an act in
violation of international law, and it would not be recognized as valid within The Nether-
lands for this reason. Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart, N.V. v. Union Banking Corp.,
Dist. Ct., Rotterdam, The Netherlands, Dec. 8, 1964. The case has been appealed by the
United States. Other incidents in which countries have accused the United States of acts of
state in violation of international law include: England-legal interference with British
shipping in 1861 (The Trent Affair) was settled by returning the persons taken from the
British ship. France-Breach of Treaty was settled withdrawing claims against France for
its seizure of United States ships in return for France's withdrawing claims against the
United States for violation of Treaty. See Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. CI. 340-78 (1886).
Norway-Seizure of Norwegian ships within United States territory without compensation
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that United States courts cannot declare invalid acts of Congress because
they are contrary to international law.
There is no power in this Court to declare null and void a statute adopted by Con-
gress or a declaration included in a treaty merely on the ground that such provision
violates a principle of international law.30
Once a policy has been declared in a treaty or statute, it is the duty of the federal
courts to accept as law the latest expression of policy made by the constitutionally
authorized policy-making authority. . .. When . . . a constitutional agency adopts
a policy contrary to a trend in international law or to a treaty or prior statute, the
courts must accept the latest act of that agency.37
PREMISE: That an act of state contrary to international law is illegal.
-There is no such thing as an illegal act of state. The very word "ille-
gality" means contrary to law, but to what law or to whose law? An
act of state is an expression of the national will. If an act is promulgated
which is not an expression of national will, the courts of the country will
correct any action taken under it, because nothing contrary to the
national will is or can be the law of a country. These are truisms. To
speak of "an illegal act of state" is a contradiction in terms s
PREMISE: That an act of state if contrary to international law is null
and void.--No nation has ever adopted such a conclusion of law as part
of its national policy. Whenever a court of first instance in any country
has looked with favor upon this contention, that court's decision has
been overruled or repudiated. The postulate that an act of state of any
country violative of international law is per se null and void, or ineffec-
tive, or that any court in any country may so declare it, lacks authority
was settled by arbitration and award against the United States, which was paid. See Nor-
wegian Shipowners' Claims, 1 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 307 (1922). Switzerland-S,:.s,
property in the United States was seized without compensation. Swvitzerland brought suit on
behalf of its nationals in the International Court. The United States invoked the Connally
Amendment, 61 Stat. 1213 (1946), T.I.A.S. No. 159S (adopted by the Senate Aug. 2, 1946,
92 Cong. Rec. 10706), to prevent adjudication. See Interhandel Case, [1959] LCJ. Rep. 6.
Continued litigation between the United States and the Svwss company claiming the amets
was settled by agreement to return part of the money received for the sale of the aszets of
the disputed ownership. For discussion of the litigation, see Rogers v. Socblt Interna-
tionale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A., 273 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 19C0).
36. Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1960).
See also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 842-43
(D. Conn. 1925).
37. Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d at 663.
3S. Of the thirty-two cases cited by the three courts in Sabbatino, in only one case did
the court feel that it must inquire into the "legality" of an act of state under the constitu-
tion of the state creating the act of state. It found it legal. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v.
S.U.P.O.R. Co. (Unione Petrolifera per l'Oriente S.pA), Civ. CL. Rome, Sept. 13, 1954,
[1955] Foro Italiano L 256, [1955] Int'l L. Rep. 23, 49 Am. J. Int'l L. 259 (1955) (Italy),
Appendix p. 624 infra.
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and is a gratuitous assumption expressed as a conclusion of law. Then,
accepting this as a premise, when one finds a law to be contrary to
international law, it may be condemned as being null and void. This is
argument in a circle.
PREMISE: That civil law countries apply the rule of public order
(ordre publique), and when a foreign act of state is found to be contrary
to the public order, its effects will not be recognized.-Foreign countries,
it is alleged, refuse to recognize the validity of acts of state which are
contrary to the local sense of public order. An examination of the thirty-
two cases will show that wherever this question has been raised and
analyzed, the courts have determined that public order of the country is
not offended by anything which occurred outside of the country. Recog-
nition of what has happened outside a country is not offensive to public
order inside a country.3 9
PREMISE: That both the United States decisions and foreign cases
support the act of state doctrine without exception, when an act of state
contrary to international law adversely affects only the citizens of the
country which commits the act of state.-This was the conclusion to
which Judge Campbell came in the Rose Mary case.40 But the Court of
Chancery in England, commenting on this case in In re Helbert Wagg &
Co.41 held that a foreign act of state, though contrary to international
law, was valid whether executed on the property of citizens or non-
citizens.
The argument in the premise is based upon the observation that if a
country commits a wrong against its own citizens, there is no interna-
tional delinquency involved because the act is not an affront to any
foreign government; but that if this same wrong is done against a
foreigner or his property, then an international delinquency has occurred
because the act is wrongful under international law. The Supreme Court
of the United States, however, in Sabbatino agreed with the Court of
Chancery of England that no such distinction should be made and that
the correct interpretation of the United States cases also was that coun-
tries should recognize the validity of a foreign act of state, whether com-
mitted on persons and property of that country, or on persons and property
of foreigners.42
39. This was specifically discussed by the Japanese and The Netherlands courts. See
Appendix pp. 629, 654 infra.
40. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate (The Rose Mary), [1953] 1 Weekly L.R. 246,
[19531 Int'l L. Rep. 316, 327-28 (Sup. Ct. Aden), Appendix p. 621 infra.
41. [1956] Ch. 323, 348-49, Appendix pp. 631-32 infra.
42. 376 U.S. at 421. The decision applied the doctrine to a Cuban company predominantly
owned by United States nationals after reviewing United States cases, particularly Ricaud v.
American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
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While it is true that many of the foreign cases cited by the three
United States courts do concern confiscation within the country commit-
ting the confiscatory act of state of property of citizens or corporations
of that state, nevertheless there are many other cases in which the action
was against a foreigner.43 In short, the cases do not support the con-
tention.
PREMISE: That the United States Department of State has the author-
ity to permit the United States courts to pass upon the validity or inval-
idity of acts of state of foreign countries, and if such acts be found to be
contrary to internatiowad law, to ignore them and to refuse to recognize
any change of title under such laws. -Fortunately no great research is
necessary here to show the incorrectness of this general statement because
it is founded upon only one incident-the "Bernstein Letter."' In this
instance the State Department advised a court in the United States that
it was unnecessary to recognize the validity of acts of Nazi officials under
the Nuremberg Laws. At this time the Allies were victorious. The Nazi
Government which had passed and enforced those laws had ceased to be.
A new government, the Allied Occupation (which was recognized as the
successor government by the courts of Germany' 5), had announced a
new and different national will: the rescission of those laws and the
return to the original owners or successors of any identifiable property
which had been transferred under these Nuremberg Laws. The successor
government had the same jurisdiction as that of the government which
had promulgated those laws.
The Nuremberg Laws were famous in their infamy. Truly, when
understood, they shocked the conscience of mankind. But, while they
43. For example, in the Iranian oil cases decided by Italian and Japaneze courts, the
injured party was not an Iranian national. Likekise in the Mexican oil expropriations, the
complaining lexican company was a subsidiary of a Dutch company. See Appendix
pp. 623-2S, 654-56 infra.
44. Letter From Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Bennett,
House, & Couts, Esqs., April 13, 1949, in 20 Dep't State Bull. 592 (1949). This letter advised
of the announced policy of the United States and the laws in Germany which, having cuc-
ceeded the Nuremberg Laws, were then in force.
It should be noted that the statement of United States policy and intention, vith that of
the other Allies, preceded the Allied occupation of Germany. By analogy within the United
States, the Emancipation Proclamation preceded the end of the Civil War.
See Bernstein v. NTr. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Mlaatzschappij, 210 F.2d
375 (2d Cir. 1954) (per curiam), the case for which the State Department's letter vwas ,rit-
ten. The addressees were attorneys for Mr. Bernstein, plaintiff. See also Bernstein v. Van
Heyghen FrZres Sodct6 Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246, 249 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 332 U.S. 772
(1947).
45. D. & W. GmbH. v. V. & V. GmbH. [Joint Export-Import Agency Case], Bundes-
gerichtshof (L Zhilsenat), Jan. 10, 1956, 19 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Ziilsachen 341 (Ger. Fed. Rep.), [19561 Int'l L. Rep. 783.
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were the law of the land, their effect within Germany had been recognized
by United States courts; now the War had ended and new laws had
displaced these laws.
By analogy to American history, one may say that the Civil War was
not fought by the North to free the slaves, but rather to preserve the
Union. It is, however, inconceivable that that war could have ended suc-
cessfully, with the preservation of the Union, without the abolition of
the institution of slavery. So in regard to the Nuremberg Laws. They were
not the political or international reason for the War. It was Germany's
aggression and that of Japan which commenced that war, but it is incon-
ceivable that World War II should have ended successfully, with the
unconditional surrender by Germany and the occupation of Germany
by the Allies, without efforts being made to repeal those laws and insofar
as possible to nullify their effects.
The "Bernstein Letter" can, therefore, be considered as merely a detail
in the exercise of the State Department's prerogative under which it is
the authoritative government agency to advise a court as to whether or
not a particular acting government is recognized or not recognized by
the United States. There, one further step was made to advise the court
what law, previously recognized, had ceased to have effect within the
territory of the country which had passed it, and what law had succeeded
the Nuremberg Laws.46 This is no precedent for the proposition that the
State Department at its uncontrolled discretion-willy-nilly--can advise
a United States court that it can disregard a law which is in effect in a
foreign country, declare it null and void-of no effect-and recognize
as valid and effective a law which no longer exists.
46. See note 44 supra and accompanying text. The relevant parts of the letter are:
1. This Government has consistently opposed the forcible acts of dispossession of a dis-
criminatory and confiscatory nature practiced by the Germans on the countries or peoples
subject to their controls. In this connection reference is made to the following:
a. Inter-Allied Declaration against Acts of Dispossession of January 5, 1943, United
States Economic Policy toward Germany (Dep't State Pub. 2630) 52;
b. Gold Declaration of February 22, 1944, 9 Fed. Reg. 2096 (1944) ;
c. The Potsdam Agreement of August 2, 1945, 13 Dep't State Bull. 153 (1945);
d. Directive to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Forces of Occupation
Regarding the Military Government of Germany, April 1945, JCS 1067, paragraphs 4 (d),
48 (e) (2), 13 Dep't State Bull. 596 (1945);
e. Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding
the Military Government of Germany, July 11, 1947, paragraph 17d, 17 Dep't State Bull.
186 (1947) ;
f. Law No. 1 of the Allied Control Council (Off. Gaz. of the Control Council for Germ.
No. 1, Oct. 29, 1945);
g. Military Government Law No. 1 (Mil. Gov. Gaz.-U.S. Zone June 1, 1946);
h. Military Government Law No. 52, secs. 1(f), 2 (Mil. Gov. Gaz.-U.S. Zone June 1,
1946);
i. Military Government Law No. 59 on Restitution of Identifiable Property (Mil. Gov.
Gaz.-U.S. Zone Nov. 10, 1947),,
2. Of special importance is Military Government Law No. 59 which shows this Govern-
ment's policy of undoing forced transfers and restituting identifiable property to persons
wrongfully deprived of such property within the period from January 30, 1933 to May 8,
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PREMISE: That to recognize the effect of a law executed on persons
or Property outside of the United States is to enforce that law within the
United States-This switch of meaning of the words "enforce" and
"recognize" is a serious error and leads to erroneous conclusions. No
United States court is required at any time to enforce within the United
States any act of state committed anywhere in the world by any foreign
government. If that foreign law is not violative of international law and
if, further, it is compatible with United States law, not by compulsion, but
by comity, it may be enforced.47 Should any foreign law be found by a
United States court to be contrary to international law or violative of
United States law, it will not be enforced in the United States; but if a
foreign law has been executed upon men and property abroad-men and
property within the jurisdiction and under the control or possession of
that foreign country, then the act of state doctrine requires that American
courts act realistically and, upon due proof, recognize the effects upon
men and things which have taken place outside of the United States and
within the jurisdiction of that foreign country. This is true even if the
property affected by the foreign act of state is later brought into the
United States.4 s Reciprocally, the United States expects the validity of its
own acts of state within its own domain to be universally recognized.
There is no exception to this rule. Such foreign recognition will be
accorded to the results of an act of state, whether or not that act of state
be violative of international law.
Perhaps an illustration will serve to clarify the matter. Suppose that
the oppressive acts of Cuba in retaliation for reduction of the United
States sugar quota had not been confiscation of the property of Compania
Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey de Cuba [hereinafter referred to as
C.A.V.] in Cuba, but rather had been conflagration of that property in
Cuba-the sugar mill, the warehouses, the very sugar involved in the
Sabbatino case had been (we suppose) destroyed by fire-and that this
destruction had represented the national will of Cuba. There is no doubt
that this destruction would have been an act of state contrary to inter-
national law, and there is no doubt the State Department would have
concluded that Cuba was liable for this damage to United States property,
1945 for reasons of race, religion, nationality, ideology or political opposition to National
Socialism. Article 1 (1). It should be noted that this policy applies generally dezpite the
exdstence of purchasers in good faith. Article 1 (2).
3. The policy of the Executive, with respect to claims aserted in the United States for
the restitution of identifiable property (or compensation in lieu thereof) lost through force,
coercion, or duress as a result of Nazi persecution in Germany, is to relieve American courts
from any restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the -alidity of the
acts of Nazi officials.
20 Dep't State Bull. 592-93 (1949).
47. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892).
48. Ricaud v. American Mletal Co., 246 U.S. at 309-10.
19651
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
although no transfer of title was decreed or attempted. Would the courts
in the United States, which decided in the Sabbatino case that an act of
state contrary to international law was of no effect, refuse to recognize
that the conflagration had occurred and that this was Cuba's executed
will against United States property and that C.A.V. had suffered wrong-
ful damage, merely because this destruction by fire was contrary to
international law? Even more dramatically, would the courts of the
United States be willing to administer the assets within the United States
of an estate of a United States national who had died in Cuba of natural
causes, but refuse to administer the estate of a United States national
who, for alleged political reasons and summarily without due process
of law, had been executed by a firing squad? The latter death was
wrongful, wrongful under international law. The lower courts said in
Sabbatino that the law was not effective to accomplish its purpose and
that the result accomplished (under Cuban law) would not be recognized
in the United States.
An Unanswered Question
By denying the validity of Cuba's act of state and holding that there
had been no transfer of title to Cuba under Cuban law, the inevitable
result of the lower court decisions was that, as a matter of law, all United
States nationals who had investment in Cuba still had title to all of their
assets. But what is title? The great bulk of the property subject to Cuba's
confiscatory decree was land, buildings, mills, factories and mines.
A definition of title to real property, which has been standard for nearly
five hundred years, is: "Title is the means whereby the owner of lands has
the just possession of his property."4 Whoever has title to property has
the right to possession, unless he himself has alienated the right to pos-
session for the time being.
In determining that Cuba had not acquired title, would the lower
courts decide that the owner still had possession or did not have posses-
sion? This is not a silly question; the answer must seriously affect the
rights of United States investors in Cuba. If the courts were sufficiently
realistic to recognize physical acts (seizure of property), even if those
courts refused to recognize a legal conclusion (title), then the United
States owners have title but no possession. Does a court which deter-
mines title have the duty to put the titleholder in possession of his prop-
erty? If not, the successful litigant has achieved but little, for the value
of title is the use of the property and the profits to be obtained from
that use. Or perhaps the courts should not have rendered such a decision,
49. Black, Law Dictionary 1655 (4th ed. 1951); see 2 Blackstone, Commentaries *195;
2 Coke Upon Littleton § 650 (Day ed. 1812).
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for by so doing they violated the usual rules of jurisdiction that "juris-
diction cannot be justly exercised by a state over property not 'within
the reach of its process, or over persons not owing them allegiance, or
not subjected to their jurisdiction, by being found within their limits. "o
This brings us to certain general considerations of law.
V. OBLIGATION AND SANCTION
All laws are of two parts. The first part of any law expresses the
obligation or the prohibition. This defines either the anti-social conduct
which members of that particular society must avoid---"Thou shalt not!"
-- or the social conduct which must be observed--"Pay your taxes."
"Send your children to school."
The second necessary part of every law is the sanction. This is a
statement of what will happen to one who offends the prohibition, or
fails to meet the obligation. It is the effort of society by threat to cause
persons to conform to the approved pattern of social conduct. It is the
punishment imposed or liability incurred if they neglect or refuse to do so.
The law relating to conduct between individuals follows the same
pattern. The prohibition, or obligation, is "Commit no tort against your
neighbor." "Perform your contracts in good faith." And the sanction is
the imposition of liability for failure to conform to this socially approved
pattern of conduct toward those among whom one lives and with whom
one does business. As stated by Black:
Sanction, n. In the original sense of the word, a penalty or punishment provided as a
means of enforcing obedience to a law. In jurisprudence, a law is said to have a sanc-
tion when there is a state which will intervene if it is disobeyed or disregrded. There-
fore international law has no legal sanction.51
But, every sanction in itself is composed of two elements. In order to
execute the laws on the social offender, the court must have jurisdiction
and control of the person or custody of the property.
Sanction in the Sabbatino Case
International law is a code of conduct which nations observe toward
each other and toward each other's nationals. The obligation involved
in Sabbatino can be stated as follows: No sovereign shall confiscate the
property of the nationals of another sovereign. To this obligation, the
lower courts in the Sabbatino case added a sanction. This sanction had
50. Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 4S6 (1313) (Johnson, J, diszenting). The
issue in this case was whether states were required to enforce the procecding in other states
or merely to recognize them. The quoted part comes from the dikent, indicating that inde-
pendent states will recognize, but enforce only in accord with their own law.s. Under the
Constitution, all states are within one general sovereignty.
51. Black, Law Dictionary 1507 (4th ed. 1951).
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never existed before in United States jurisprudence. There is no evidence
that it existed in the jurisprudence of foreign countries. The sanction
affects only sovereigns. It is: If any foreign country violates the obli-
gation and passes a confiscatory act purporting to affect the property
of the nationals of another country, the courts of any other country may
declare such an act of state null and void and seize any property which
the sovereign claims to own by reason of such law.
This is not merely a conclusion from what the lower courts did-not
a mere inference from statements in the case. The court of appeals, in
affirming the district court, characterized its own actions in completely
unmistakable terms and said:
Refusal by municipal courts of one sovereignty to sanction [approve] the actions of
a foreign state done contrary to the law of nations will often be the only deterrent to
such violations. More important, the only relief [sanction] open to persons injured by
a confiscation will often be the invalidation of the confiscating country's title to the
confiscated goods by decree of a court of another country.52
VI. WHY THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT IN
Sabbatino WAS PRAISED
When the district court decision was handed down, there had been no
freezing of Cuban property in the United States; trade was gradually
being restricted between the two countries, but no general embargo had
been established against trade with Cuba. But by the time the case
reached the Supreme Court, Cuba could not bring any further property
into the United States; United States citizens could not trade with Cuba.
The money paid as the purchase price of the sugar in the Sabbatino case
was frozen, along with all other property claimed by the Cuban Govern-
ment within the United States."3
The district court decided the Sabbatino case in an atmosphere of
national outrage. Not only had Cuba seized a billion dollars worth of
property of United States nationals, but it had the effrontery to try to
sell some of those assets to United States citizens, payment to be made
in New York. The appearance in court, to collect the purchase price of
the sugar (part of the confiscated property), by an agent of the Cuban
Government seemed intolerable. The district court decision was com-
mended, and this commendation related particularly to two features of
52. 307 F.2d at 868.
53. On February 3, 1962, all trade, including tobacco, between the Republic of Cuba and
the United States was prohibited, except under license. For the text of the Presidential
Proclamation and also for a background of United States trade relations with Cuba under
Castro, see N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1962, p. 22, cols. 1-3. Restrictions on trade had been com-
menced as early as the fall of 1960. United States diplomats were withdrawn January 3,
1961. The freezing regulations were imposed by the United States Treasury on July 8, 1963.
Federal Reserve Bank Circular 5353; see 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101-.801 (Supp. 1964).
[Vol. 33
ACT OF STATE
the decision. First, Cuba did not receive the purchase price; it was
awarded to a representative of the company whose property had been
confiscated. Second, the decision was considered a notice to the world
that the United States market would be closed to the sale of confiscated
goods, particularly those seized from nationals of the United States-
the United States will not become a "thieves' market."
The difficulty with the decision of the lower court was that it created
a new national policy and a new rule of international relations-an
exception to the act of state doctrine. The tripartite division of the func-
tions of our government does not give to the courts the authority to
create national policy or rules of international relations.
The efforts of the lower courts, by their decisions, to prevent Cuba
from selling confiscated goods in the United States and receiving the
money-the two features of their decisions which received such acclaim
-thereafter became national policy. There was an embargo against
Cuban goods; there was a freezing of Cuba's assets in the United States.
Both were accomplished, under authority granted by Congress, by Execu-
tive action54 Congress can create any national policy it desires, subject
only to the limitations imposed on it by the Constitution. An embargo-
however obtained-means, as it does here, that no more property from
Cuba, confiscated or not, will come into the United States. The courts
of the United States will not again have an opportunity to give to former
owners any part of the property, or its proceeds, confiscated by Cuba,
and, as stated above, Cuba cannot have the use of any of its own property
in this country as it has been "frozen."
In Sabbatihw, the lower courts attempted to restore 175,000 dollars
to an American company whose unexportable confiscated assets of land
and buildings in Cuba were worth more than 93,000,000 dollars.P This
was but 1/50 of one per cent of the value of all United States property
seized in Cuba, and even this pittance would go only to one company.
How shall this company, C.A.V., seek redress for the 93,000,000 dollars,
and how shall all the other corporations and persons whose property has
been confiscated in Cuba seek redress for their losses?
The agelong principles subscribed to by the United States and other
countries are: Confiscation of the assets of nationals of a country is an
affront against the government of that country which, as the representa-
tive of its nationals, then seeks to secure redress. A foreign confiscatory
act of state is valid; the title to property within the jurisdiction of the
confiscating government and under its control has been transferred; and
54. Ibid.
55. C.A.V. filed a claim with the State Department against Cuba for $ the
total value of its property in Cuba. See Schvartz v. Compania Azucarera Vertient-es.Cama-
guey de Cuba, 39 Misc. 2d 63, 70-71, 240 N.Y.S.2d 247, 254-55 (Sup. CL 1962).
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the country owes the value of the confiscated assets. The nationals
of any country have never had any other means of redress than through
the executive agencies of their own government.
This previously existing method of government-to-government dealing
in behalf of each sovereign's nationals now is being presented with a new
problem in the form of the rider, known as the Hickenlooper Amendment,
to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, which is frankly stated to be a
law the purpose of which is to overrule the Supreme Court decision in
the Sabbatino case and recreate the new interpretation of law laid down
by the lower courts in that case:50 that courts are free to declare an act
of state of a foreign country which they find contrary to international law
to be null and void. Thus, the effects of this intended variation from the
doctrine of the act of state must be examined.
VII. EFFECT OF INVALIDATION OF CUBA'S ACT OF STATE ON EFFORTS
To SECURE REDRESS FOR PROPERTY CONFISCATED IN CUBA
The establishment of the principle that the confiscatory acts of Cuba
are null and void will be of great disadvantage to all Americans whose
property has been seized by Cuba. If it now is the law of the United
States that the courts of the United States can invalidate the confiscatory
acts of Cuba, then we have substituted for the old rule (that title is
transferred) a new rule that United States nationals still own all of their
property in Cuba, for Cuba did not acquire title-the title to the property
was retained by United States investors in Cuba. Thus they appear to
retain individual rights in Cuba against Cuba. But who will sponsor
them; who will enforce their right?
Now we may properly ask ourselves a few searching questions as to
what our own goverment can do under the limitation placed upon it by
this abolition of the fundamental rule of the act of state doctrine. If
United States nationals still own their property in Cuba, it is question-
able whether or not as a matter of law the United States can claim an
affront to the United States. If the bargaining power of the United States
is limited to efforts to induce Cuba to permit United States nationals to
occupy the property, title to which is still theirs, has the United States an
ultimate duty to place the owners in possession of the property? Certainly
the courts of the United States, which under this act could now purport
to give continued right to title to United States nationals (as the lower
courts did in Sabbatino), can do nothing more. A court can create a sanc-
tion, as the lower courts did in Sabbatino and then, outside of the court
(but under the court's jurisdiction), invoke whatever force is necessary to
make that decision become a reality; it can, and does, do this when it has
jurisdiction. But even under the amendment, the courts cannot exercise
56. See notes 15-20 supra and accompanying text.
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or invoke any power whatever against a foreign sovereign government.
In such a situation could the State Department offer to sell the property
to Cuba and give good title-which in Cuba, Cuba already has under
Cuban law? In any effort at lump sum settlement, must our Government
secure consent of all the United States nationals who still hold title
before it can conclude such a settlement? Imagination can propound other
questions which would arise under such an unrealistic limitation placed
upon the efforts of the United States to secure redress for its nationals.
But this is not all. Under Cuban confiscatory law, Cuba nationalized
United States businesses and incorporated them into Cuba's national
economy. In so doing, Cuban law provided that Cuba would assume all
the liabilities of these businesses in Cuba. Are the United States owners
willing to admit their full liabilities for any outstanding commitments in
Cuba as of the time of Cuba's confiscatory decrees? If Cuba has no title,
could we assume under this United States law that Cuba has nevertheless
assumed the liabilities? Also if United States citizens still have title to
their property in Cuba, United States nationals still own much of the
goods being shipped out of Cuba just as one of them owned the sugar. The
United States has been singularly unsuccessful in persuading its neighbors
and other allies not to trade with Cuba, so that Cuba now trades with
both the Soviet bloc and the Western bloc, although a few neighbors of
Cuba have shown some fear of the present regime and willingness to
cooperate with the United States. Will the friendly and allied countries
who want Cuban products be willing to recognize United States title to
them?
Nothing but harm and confusion and loss of dignity to the United
States can be achieved by restating the principle that a foreign govern-
ment cannot commit an act of state in contravention of international law.
The rider to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, couched in language
ontradictory and confusing and not yet interpreted by any court in any
case, can lead only to prolonged and expensive litigationP7 It cannot put
zunyone in possession of the property in Cuba; it cannot secure compensa-
tion for property now occupied by Cuba.
VIII. A PRoPosAL
In adopting the rider to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Congress
has overthrown the Supreme Court decision in Sabbatino, which con-
tinued the act of state doctrine, and has expressed its intention to adopt
the reasoning of the lower courts in that case, which created a new
theory of law to take the place of the act of state doctrine. This excep-
57. For further discussion of this, see the comments of Professor Louis Henhin, in Act
of State: Sabbatino in the Courts and in Congress, 3 Columbia J. Transnational L. 99,
107-15 (1965).
1965]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
tion, which refuses to recognize change of title when a foreign confisca-
tory act of state is in violation of international law, puts a severe limita-
tion on negotiations between the United States Government, through the
State Department, and the Government of Cuba for one of the two things
we can hope to get from Cuba-the return of our nationals' confiscated
property, or payment for it by Cuba. If we continue the illusory thesis
that we still have title (to which is added the ramification, does title go
with or without possession?), how complicated is the argument we give
to the State Department seeking either compensation or the return of the
property? What defenses do we give to Cuba? And in adopting this new
theory of law, we set ourselves quite apart from judicial interpretation
in international commercial cases throughout the world.
Instead of this rider, effective action to accomplish the desired result,
and avoid complications, indefiniteness and uncertainties, is for Congress
to substitute for the amendment a bill, referring not only to Cuba but
announcing as a national policy, that it is unlawful to bring into the
United States any property the title to which has been acquired directly
or indirectly by a confiscatory act of state of any foreign state; and, to
anticipate the possibility that some goods might nevertheless be smuggled
into the United States and be identified as property previously belonging
to a national of the United States, to provide that such contraband
goods, the title to which is forfeited to the United States on condemnation
as contraband, be re-transferred to the United States national who could
prove he was the former owner of them.
Then, as in past time, the United States Government, through the State
Department, would be free to bargain with Cuba for redress, for return of
property, for compensation for losses caused by confiscation and, in
efforts to attain this end, to place upon Cuba such economic and political
pressure as may properly be used in the national interest.
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A. Cases Resulting From the Iranian Oil Confiscations
The British Protectorate of Aden
1. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate (The Rose Mary), Sup. CL Aden
[1953] 1 Weekly L.R. 246, [1953] Int'l L. Rep. 316.
We may properly commence the weighing of cases with the one case,
the Rose Mary case, which alone supported an exception to the act of
state doctrine-that if the act of state of a foreign state is contrary to
international law, it may be and should be declared null and void, and
it is not valid to transfer title in spite of the sovereign's intention to do so.
Facts. In the year 1933, the Government of Iran, a country formerly
known as Persia and still frequently referred to as Persia, granted certain
concessions to a corporation, predominately British, known as the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company. The concession gave to this company the right to explore for oil
within a large area of the country and to extract and refine the oil it found.
A schedule was made for payments to the Iranian Government depending in
amount, of course, upon the success of the venture. The concession agreement
contained various clauses among which were that it was not to be abrogated
by legislation and was to continue until December 31, 1993. Pursuant to the
agreement, the company explored, found oil, extracted it, built refineries, sold
oil and paid the necessary amounts under the agreement to the Iranian Gov-
ernment. The company profitably exercised its rights under the concession
agreement until the year 1951 when, under the aging and unstable Premier
.Mossedagh, the Iranian Government by legislation abrogated the agreement
and nationalized the oil fields and the facilities for extracting and refining
off and set up a government bureau to carry on this work. The government
bureau took over the operations and sold oil thereafter.
In 1952, an Italian company purchased oil from this Iranian Government
bureau and directed a shipload of the oil to be carried to Bari, Italy, where
it was to be re-shipped at the direction of a Swiss purchaser. While the ship
was at sea on this voyage from Iran to Italy, the captain of the ship received
conflicting orders from the owners of the ship and the charterers. An English
army airplane circled the ship one day, and forty miles outside the port of
Aden, the ship was met by a tug with an agent of the owners of the ship on
board who directed the captain to deviate from his voyage and come into the
harbor of Aden, disregarding any contrary orders. This he did. Immediately,
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, as the holders of the concession in Iran, claimed
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title to the oil in the ship and brought suit in Aden, placing the oil under
judicial restraint pending determination of title.
Aden occupies a strategic position geographically on the Gulf of Aden, com-
manding entrance to the Red Sea. Aden at that time was a British protectorate
and the court was presided over by a British judge. There was no appeal court
in Aden, appeal then having to be made to the British court sitting at Nairobi;
and if further review was necessary in a case, the review would come before
the English Privy Council.
Contention and Decision. The purchasers of the oil interposed two defenses
to the claim of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company: one, that the court lacked
jurisdiction. The argument here was that the ship was on a voyage which
did not include entrance to the port of Aden; the cargo of the ship, the oil,
was destined for Italy. The captain testified concerning the conflicting and
confused orders be had received and the fact he was met at sea by a representa-
tive of the owners of the ship; he stated that one of his principle reasons for
diverting the ship from its course to Aden was fear of being bombed by a
British R.A.F. plane. The court brushed aside his objections to jurisdiction,
and particularly as to the airplane incident, saying:
"As to his fear of the aeroplane, it seems to me very unlikely that this really existed.
No reasonable man could think it likely that Her Majesty's Government in the year
1952 would try to resolve a commercial dispute by what would be little short of an
act of war."58
The second defense was that purchase of the oil had been made from the Bureau
of the Iranian Government which had acquired title to the oil under the
Nationalization Law of Iran, and physical seizure of the properties under the
concession.
The decision of the Aden court was that the abrogation of the concession
was an act contrary to international law and held that, therefore, the act was
invalid. The Aden court decided that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was
still the owner of all of the oil coming out of Iran.
The following cases (these cases were also among the thirty-two
cited by the three United States courts in the Sabbatino case) were cited
by the Aden court for its authority in holding that an act of state
contrary to international law was invalid, and that this abrogation of
the concession and seizure of the concession property did not transfer
title to any of the oil produced from that concession.
Aksionairnoye Obschestvo A.M. Luther v. James Sagor & Co. (Eng.)59
Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz (Eng.) 60
Wolff v. Oxholm (Eng.) 61
58. [1953] Int'l L. Rep. at 319-20.
59. Appendix p. 632 infra.
60. Appendix p. 633 infra.
61. Appendix p. 637 infra.
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In re Fried Krupp A.G. (Eng.)0
Soci~tj Potasas lbericas v. Bloch (Fr.) 63
Union des Ripubliques Socialistes Sovitiques v. Intendant Ginlral Bourgeois s
Qualiti et Socijtg La Ropit (Fr.)3 4
These sx cases cited by the Court of Aden will be reviewed later
to show (a) that the first two English cases were reviewed by the Chan-
cery Court of England in another case which found that the Aden court
had misconstrued these cases in refusing to hold that recognition of
the act of state doctrine was the law of England. (b) The next two listed
English cases show the same principles as certain leading United States
cases and, therefore, are not authority for abrogation of, or exception
to, the act of state doctrine as they accord with United States law.
(c) Finally, the two French cases did not involve an executed acrt of
state and are, therefore, irrelevant and do conform to the act of state
doctrine.
Let us now follow more shipments of that oil from the nationalized
Iranian oil fields and observe the legal results in other countries where
there was controversy.
The Italian Cases
Five ships had been loaded with Iranian oil and had headed for
Italy. One of these, the ship mentioned above-the Rose Mary, was the
one diverted to Aden. However, the four other ships loaded with oil
from these same Iranian fields had also been sold to an Italian concern
and did arrive in Italy.
2. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co. (Unione Petrolifera per
l'Oriente, S.p.A.) (The Miriella), Civ. Tribunal Venice, March 11,
1953, 78 f1 Foro Italiano i. 719 (1953), [1955] Int'l L. Rep. 19
(Italy).
Facts. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company instituted proceedings in Italian
courts as to the cargo of each of these ships, as it had done in Aden, claiming
ownership of the oil, and applied to the Court in Venice for judicial seques-
tration, pending the final hearing and determination of its claim of title to
this oil. The oil from Iran, brought in the ship Miriella, was in storage in
Venice.
Contention and Decision. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company contended that title
to this oil had not passed to the Government of Iran, nor to any of its agents,
by the Nationalization Law of Iran, because that law was contrary to inter-
62. Appendix p. 638 infra.
63. Appendix p. 641 infra.
64. Appendix p. 640 infra.
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national law and therefore invalid. The court refused to grant the application
and in a relatively brief opinion, after stating the facts and the contentions
of the parties, said:
"According to the most authoritative writers and case-law, it would appear re-
dundant to enquire whether the principles adopted by a foreign Legislature are con-
trary to those adopted by our Legislature if the acts contrary to public order have
taken place in a foreign country, seeing that the proceedings before the Italian Court
deal only with the juridical consequences of these acts, the acts themselves having-
from a legal point of view-been finally concluded abroad.
"The oil which forms the subject of the present dispute was taken by the Persian
Government in Persia by virtue of the Nationalization Law, and in Persia it was
disposed of in favour of S.U.P.O.R by a contract of sale: all this was in conformity
with the judicial system of the Persian Government, on whose territory these acts
(expropriation and sale and purchase) took place, with the legal and material con-
sequences flowing therefrom. The recognition in Italy of the validity of the effects
which these acts had already had in Persia cannot be termed co-operation to make
them become effective; it constitutes no more than an acknowledgment that the
effects have indeed taken place, i.e., accepting the effects produced, which in them-
selves-and considered separately from their cause-are in no way contrary to public
order. The Nationalization Law should not, therefore, be examined from the point of
view of public order.
"If, however, the question is tested by examining the Nationalization Law in
regard to public order, which has been referred to at some length in the contentions
put forward on behalf of A.I.O.C., the claim of ownership appears unjustified, which
supports the rejection of the request for sequestration."0 8
Clearly the court's decision supported the act of state doctrine.
3. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co. (Unione Petrolifera per
l'Oriente S.p.A.), Civ. Ct. Rome, Sept. 13, 1954, [1955] Foro Italiano
I. 256, [1955] Int'l L. Rep. 23 (Italy)."8
Facts. This same case was then considered by the Civil Court of Rome and
a decision was handed down by that court about a year later. The Civil Court
of Rome at the same time and in the same opinion considered, in addition to
the claim for oil brought to Venice in the above-mentioned ship, Miriella, the
claim of title to oil brought from Iran in the three other ships, the Alba, the
Brezza, and the Salso.
Contention and Decision. The court at Rome affirmed the court of Venice,
holding that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was not the owner, but instead
that the purchaser, who bought the oil from the National Iranian Oil Company,
the government agency of Iran, held good title.
The opinion of the Civil Court of Rome was lengthy and analytical and
in some instances hypothetical. First, the court endeavored to indicate the
65. [1955] Intl L. Rep. at 21.
66. Since the Rome court reviewed additional claims as well as that claim decided by
the Venice court, these two Italian decisions are counted as two cases out of the total
thirty-two listed in this article.
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meaning of "public order" as the concept indicated by those words was known
and enforced in Italy. The court indicated the difference between cnforccncnt
of an act in Italy which was contrary to public order and the mere recognition
of the legal results of an act taken outside of Italy which, had it occurred in
Italy, would have been against public order. To clarify this distinction, the
court gave the following illustration:
"It may thus happen that, in Italy, inheritance rights of the mother and son of a
polygamous marriage are recognized, although such a marriage would not be recog-
nized in Italy as being contrary to our public policy; it nevertheless has produced its
effects abroad."0 7
Having satisfied itself as to the facts, the meaning of this law in Iran, and
its "legality" there (i.e., validity in Iran under Iranian law), the court was
then in position to make its findings which in brief, and as numbered in the
opinion, were:
1. The Iranian Nationalization Laws of 1951 and 1952 cannot be said to
be contrary to the Persian (Iranian) constitution.
2. The Iranian Nationalization Laws are not contrary to Italian public
policy.
3. The existence of an economic public interest in the expropriation prevents
the (Italian) court from regarding the oil nationalization law as being
of a political nature so as to exclude its application in Italy or from
regarding the law as discriminatory in the sense of incompatibility with
international law.
4. The oil nationalization law was not contrary to the generally accepted
rules of international law.Cs
Both the Court of Venice and the Court of Rome recognized the
validity of the Iranian nationalization laws. The Court of Rome was
convinced that courts of other countries also supported this doctrine,
and said:
"The judgment of the Civil Court of Antwerp of February 21, 1939,c9 relating to
the same question, that of the Court of Appeal of Arnhem of June 12, 1939,7o and
that of the District Court of New York (Southern District) of April 13, 1939,1
definitely deny that any foreign court is entitled to decide on the lawfulneis of an
expropriation carried out by a foreign Government; the same conclusion was reached
67. [1955] Int'l L. Rep. at 2S.
68. Id. at 36-42.
69. "Propetral," "Petroservice" & 'Tetrolest" v. Compania Mexicano do Petroleo :
Tankage & Transport: Belgique Judiciaire (1939), [193S-1940] Ann. Dig. (No. 11).
70. Paroservice of Paris v. El Agula (1940), [1919-1942] Ann. Dig. 19 (No. 20) (Supp.
Vol.).
71. Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 28 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y.
1939).
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by the Court of Tokyo in its judgment of September 21, 1953,72 relating to the
Persian oil nationalization.
73
Yet quotations from this decision of the Court of Rome were cited by
the district court in Sabbatino in support of the proposition on which
it decided the Sabbatino case. 74 But to the contrary, the Rome Court had
decided: (1) the Iranian confiscation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil conces-
sion was not contrary to international law; (2) that the Nationalization
Law transferred title; and (3) that this title would be recognized in
Italy as valid. It remains, therefore, to place the quotations from the
Italian case in their immediate context and consider them against the
background of the whole Italian opinion. The quotations from the Court
of Rome opinion used by the United States District Court are indicated
by italics in the following excerpts from the decision of the Court of
Rome:
"The Court recalls that the rules of foreign private international law and foreign
political laws cannot be applied in Italy independently of the effects produced by
them and independently of any consideration regarding their relation to international
public policy.
"Whether or not provisions of foreign laws are applicable in Italy depends on the
nature of those provisions. If the laws have been enacted for reasons of political
racial hatred, then the principle of 'non-intervention' in the domestic policy of a
foreign country, the consideration of the nature of such laws, and especially whether
they are contrary to international public policy, and the sovereignty of the national
State in the territory of which it is sought to apply them, prevent, according to the
accepted doctrine, such laws from having extra-territorial effect. Thus, discriminatory
laws enacted out of hatred, against aliens or against persons of any particular race
or category or against persons belonging to specified social or political groups, cannot
be applied in Italy because they run counter to the internationally accepted principle
of the equality of individuals before the law.
"Such principles, developed by international doctrine, are generally accepted by
the jurisprudence of the various countries. However, as has been noted, no such
predominantly political and persecutory purpose as characterizes the political, racial,
expulsory laws which have been met with elsewhere is found in the Persian nationaliz-
ing legislation."75
"As has been stated above, however, this Court holds that the Italian courts have
the right and the duty to examine a foreign Law, from the point of view of its
legality, so as to establish whether it is contrary to the Constitution of the foreign
country concerned or to international public policy or to any generally accepted
principles of international law, and this on the basis of Article 31 of the Preliminary
Rules to the Italian Civil Code and Article 10 of our Constitution. In consequence,
72. See note 70 supra.
73. [1955] Int'l L. Rep. at 41-42. Note that the four cases cited, notes 69-72 supra, sup-
ported the act of state doctrine.
74. 193 F. Supp. at 384 n.22, 385 n.25.
75. [1955] Int'l L. Rep. at 39-40.
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the Italian courts must refuse to apply in Italy any foreign Law which decrees an
expropriation, not for reasons of public interest but for purely political, persectory,
discriminatory, racial and confiscatory motives. Furthermore, the Italian courts must
refuse to apply in Italy such foreign Laws as may, even for non-political and non-
persecutory motives, decree expropriation of the property of any foreign national
without compensation.
"The Court holds that in this particular case the Iranian Oil Nationalization Laws
of 1951-1952 may, in accordance with the principles which have been mentioned, be
applied in Italy as they are not contrary either to the Iranian Constitution or to
international public policy or to any generally accepted principles of international
law, since they decree by statute expropriation for reasons of the public interest of
Iran and not for motives of persecution or confiscation or for political or discriminatory
motives, and since they recognize the right of the expropriated foreign nationals to
compensation. ' 76
What do the italicized parts of these quotations mean? Why did the
Court of Rome insert such thought? The obvious meaning of the first
quotation when read in context is that the courts of Italy will give no
extraterritorial effect to foreign acts of state which are contrary to
or incompatible with Italian law, acts which would not be tolerated in
Italy. This is what the court said. But this is exactly the position taken
by the American courts which support the act of state doctrine.
The exact wording of the first quotation, as well as the second, should
perhaps be read against an even broader background than this one case.
This was a decision of an Italian court, a court of a country which had
but lately been fascist, an ex-ally of the inhuman Hitler. Italy had good
reason to know what the Allies thought of the Nuremberg laws, laws
which only the victorious conclusion of the most extensive and bloody
war in history could erase, laws which after they had been erased were
not recognized either in Germany or in the United States. By this ex-
planation, this defense, this apology, the Italian court marked out this
one type of law and assured itself and the world that by recognizing
the validity of the Iranian seizures, the court was not giving support
to law similar to those other infamous laws.
One may properly question the probative value in the Sabbatino
case of either of these obiter dicta from the opinion of the Court of
Rome. The district court, court of appeals and the one dissenting opinion
of the Supreme Court quoted one or the other or both of them. In each
instance their conclusion was that the Cuban law was invalid, and the
obvious inference from these quotations was that Italian courts would
not recognize the validity of such a law. But the Italian courts did recog-
nize, in Italy, the change of title decreed by Iran in its confiscatory law
nationalizing the oil concessions of a foreigner. Not only did Italy
76. Id. at 42.
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recognize the validity of the Iranian law but held it was not contrary
to international law. If any part of the opinion of the Court of Rome
is to be used to support an opinion that the Cuban confiscation law is
invalid, it would seem reasonable to require an explanation why the
Iranian law did not offend the principles expressed in the obiter dicta
quoted, but why the Cuban law does offend. Of course every confisca-
tion followed its own pattern and the compensation offered in each case
differed, but in each instance their victim considered that the suggested
compensation was wholly inadequate. Certainly when obiter dicta is em-
ployed as proof of a principle of law and no case whatever is cited from
that same jurisdiction which has been decided on the principles expressed
in the obiter dicta, one may naturally surmise there is no decided case
supporting the principle, else such a case would have been cited.
The Japanese Case
4. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabuski Kaisha, Dist. Ct.
Tokyo, [1953] Int'l L. Rep. 305, aff'd, High Ct., Tokyo, [1953]
Int'l L. Rep. 312 (Japan).
Facts. A Japanese company also had purchased oil in Iran from the
Iranian Government agency, and had transported that oil to Japan in its own
tanker, Nissho Maru. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company once again asserted
title to the oil from Iran. This time the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company asked a
Tokyo District Court to place the oil in the custody of the court preliminary
to a decision on the company's claim that it had title to the oil. This was the
same form of relief the company bad asked from the Italian Court of Venice.
Contention and Decision. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company claimed in this case,
as it had claimed before, that since it was a concessionaire for the extraction and
refining of oil in Iran, the Nationalization Law of Iran, abrogating that con-
cession, therefore, being a breach of the concession agreement, did not transfer
title to the oil to the Iranian Government. The District Court of Tokyo dis-
missed the application of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as the Italian court
had done; it held that the Nationalization Law was valid; that the applicants
had lost all their rights and interest under the concession and did not have title
to the oil in dispute. The case was then appealed. The decision was confirmed
by the higher court, also in Tokyo.
The District Court in Tokyo said:
"It cannot be denied that there exists a rule of international law which makes an act
of confiscating without compensation a foreign interest in a country a wrongful act
under international law. As a result of that rule, a foreigner who suffers from such
an act of confiscation, or his own Government acting in his interests, will naturally
demand, and press the confiscating Government for payment of compensation. How-
ever, the question whether or not the courts of a third State have power to declare
such an act of another State invalid, or to deny the effect of the act, is quite a different
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proposition. This Court is not convinced that there exists a universally established
principle of international law which answers the question in the affirmative." 77
One new factor raised in the Japanese courts in this case was Law No. 10 of
1898, known as the Hirei, which embodies the rules of private international
law recognized in Japan. Article 30 of Law No. 10 reads:
"In the application of foreign law-by virtue of preceding articles of this law-
provisions thereof which are against public order and good morals shall not be
applied."78
In regard to this, the Appeal Court in Japan said:
"The appellants claim that to recognize the effect of the Nationalization Law or
hold that the appellants have lost their rights in the oil in question would infringe
the terms of Article 30 of the H~rei; but as explained above, the Nationalization
Law cannot simply be regarded as a law by which the rights of foreign nationals are
confiscated. And the present Court, which has failed to find any established rules of
international law governing the matter, has confined itself to taking the attitude that
it is impossible to pass on the validity or invalidity of the said Law and has not con-
cluded positively that the Law is valid. This has had indirectly the same effect as
if we recognized the Nationalization Law as valid; and that has resulted in our
denying the appellants' ownership of the oil in question. We do not, however, think
that these matters are contrary to the public policy of this country."70
Thus, the courts of Japan adopted a rule of restraint and refused to
decide whether the Nationalization Law of Iran was valid or not; in
short, refused to "sit in judgment" on the validity of a foreign act of
state. The result of this was that the Nationalization Law was deemed
to be valid; its effect was recognized in Japan. Thus, the decisions of
both Japanese courts recognized the act of state doctrine. Since the
Nationalization Law of Iran was treated as valid, the conclusion of
the court was that the Japanese company in purchasing the oil from
the Government of Iran received good title.
B. Attitude of the United States Government Toward the
Iranian Oil Seizures s ')
While the cases above cited were being instituted in various countries
and taking their judicial way towards judgment, British interests in-
volved in the Iranian confiscation indicated their concern that some of
this oil could be sold in the United States. Obviously they hoped that
77. [1953] Int'l L. Rep. at 309.
78. Id. at 306 n.2.
79. [1953] Int'l L. Rep. at 316.
S0. The statement of United States attitude toward the Iranian oil sEizures is based on
the article by Stanley D. Metzger, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Relations, 23 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 831 (1962). Professor Metzger was formerly Assistant Legal Adviser, United
States Department of State.
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the United States would prevent the sale of any of this Iranian oil within
this country. The obvious purpose here was to put economic pressures
upon Iran. Here we can observe that the judicial argument about in-
ternational law and exceptions to the act of the state doctrine is not
primarily to recover any of the confiscated property; little, if any,
would be recovered-the refusal to recognize judicially the validity of
any foreign act of state contrary to international law is to put economic
pressure on the country committing the act of state, usually a confisca-
tion, to cause that country to reconsider its action. The economic pres-
sure is intended to be achieved by depriving the confiscating country
of its customary markets. Application of economic pressures on a foreign
country is, however, not a judicial, but a political matter. It is to create
an embargo.
The United States Government treated these suggestions with sym-
pathy but with understanding of the world situation. Of course, the
United States desired to maintain friendly relations with Great Britain
and desired to do what it might to discourage confiscation and desired
to see fair treatment of the British-dominated oil companies. But the
political situation was not wholly simple, and a satisfactory solution
was difficult because of the political situation in Iran. The political de-
partments of our Government were confident that Mossedagh, the
spokesman for his country, though he may have been little more than
a figurehead, was, in spite of his confiscatory decrees, more friendly to
the West than to the East. However, there were powerful parties or
cliques favorable to the Soviet bloc which only awaited the fall of this
aged, and perhaps incompetent, person. If he was deprived of all of his
markets as desired by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the United
States feared, with good reason, that Mossedagh would fall because
of the resulting financial crisis; the Communists would take over and
one more country would slip behind the Iron Curtain.
The United States, therefore, toyed with the suggestion which was
to prevent the sale of oil within the United States. It was announced
that the United States Navy would not buy oil from Iran. However,
the United States Government permitted all United States corporations
who wished to buy oil from Iran to do so. They could sell it in the
United States if they wished. If litigation resulted, that was a business
risk, but in this the United States relied upon a policy of adherence to
the act of state doctrine, not then believing that any court of the United
States would interject itself into such political matters of national policy
adopted by the executive branch.
The United States used its political power wisely. It added somewhat
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to the economic pressure upon Mossedagh. However, permitting some
of the confiscated oil to be purchased by United States companies was
a factor enabling him to maintain some markets and receive some na-
tional revenue; and he remained in power until a government favorable
to the West could succeed him by taking over the control of that un-
happy country. Later, a settlement was made between the Government
of Iran and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
C. English Cases Interpreted Erroneously in the Rose Mary Case
The Rose Mary case is indeed cited by all of those who support the
desirability of an exception to the act of state doctrine-that if the act
is contrary to international law, its effect will not be recognized. Well
may those who support this new doctrine cherish the one case of the
trial court of the British Protectorate of Aden, for it is the only case
on which they can rely. But let us look further to the authorities on
which the court of Aden itself relied. Two of the English cases on which
the court of Aden principally relied were later reviewed by the English
Court of Chancery in deciding another case, In rc Hlbcrt Wagg & Co.,,"
which found that the Aden judge who decided the Rose Mary case had
misinterpreted these two English cases. The significance of In re Helbert
Wagg & Co. thus rests principally on the comment therein about these
two English cases cited by the Aden judge in the Rose Mary case, and
which that Aden judge had held were not precedent to prevent an ex-
ception to the act of state doctrine. The English Court of Chancery
found the statement of facts in the Rose Mary case correct, but dis-
agreed with the court of Aden in its interpretation of applicable law.
Of this, the English Court of Chancery in the Wagg case said:
I do not challenge the correctness of the decision in the Rose Mary case upon the
facts of that case, but Campbell J. [judge of the trial court of the British Protectorate
of Aden] came to the conclusion that the authorities both of this and other countries
justified the formulation of a more general principle, namely: (1) all legislation that
expropriates without compensation is contrary to international law; and (2) that
such law is incorporated in the domestic law of Aden and accordingly such legislation
will not be recognized as valid in the courts of Aden. Unless the law of England
takes a different view of international law from the law of Aden, the judge's con-
clusions can only be correct if his interpretation of Al:sionainzoye Obseliestvo A.1
Luther v. James Sagor & Co. and Princess Palcy Olga v. Wlcis is correct.6 -
The English Court of Chancery then proceeded to find that the Aden
judge's interpretation of these two cases (Aksionairnoye Obschestvo
81. [19561 Ch. 323.
82. Id. at 346.
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A.M. Luther v. James Sagor & Co."3 and Princess Paley Olga v.
Weisz 4) was incorrect. With due judicial courtesy, but no less em-
phatically, Judge Upjohn, speaking for the Court of Chancery of
England, continued:
With all respect to Campbell J., I think Luther v. Sagar and Princess Paley Olga
v. Weisz laid down principles of general application not limited to nationals of the
confiscating State.8 5
Michael Mann, a writer on legal topics, placed the argument of the
Court of Chancery of England-in relation to its comment on the rea-
soning of Judge Campbell-in the form of a syllogism as follows:
In fact, as the learned judge appreciated, The Rose Mary was decided upon a
syllogism which can be stated as follows:
(i) It is contrary to International Law to expropriate an alien's property without
compensation.
(ii) International Law is part of the law of England.
(iii) Therefore when the deprived person is, say, a British subject and compen-
sation has been neither paid nor offered, an English court cannot recognise the ex-
propriation since it has been illegally effected.
Both major and minor premise may be correct, but the inference has been debated
on the ground that the rule of International Law does not deal with questions of title
but merely provides that certain expropriations give rise to an internationally valid
demand for compensation. It is said that the actual taking is not impugned, and
that the international delinquency is only committed thereafter upon failure to pay
any or any adequate compensation."0
English law, thus, is: an act of state of a foreign country contrary to
international law will be recognized as valid in that foreign country.
This is true, regardless of the nationality of the person injured by the
act of state. When a foreign country confiscates property of any for-
eigner, that country becomes liable to the foreigner's country.
5. Aksionairnoye Obschestvo A.M. Luther v. James Sagor & Co.,
[1921] 3 K.B. 532 (C.A.).
Facts. The plaintiff, formerly a Russian company, had operated a factory
in Russia which made veneer and plywood. On June 20, 1918, a confiscatory
decree was passed by the Soviet, which took possession of the factory sometime
later. When the factory ceased operating under Luther in 1919, there had been
on hand a large stock of manufactured boards stamped with the trade name
of the foreign company on whose order they had been made. Sometime in 1920,
a representative of the trade mission of the new Soviet Government, then
83. Appendix p. 632 infra.
84. Appendix p. 633 infra.
85. [1956] Ch. at 348-49.
86. Mann, Re Claim by Helbert Wagg & Co., Ltd., 5 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 295, 299 (1956).
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unrecognized by England, made a contract in England with Sagor and Company
to sell lumber, and the readily identifiable boards were sent to England in
fatisfaction of this contract. Luther, the previous owner, now outside of Russia,
immediately claimed the boards as his property.
Contention and Decision. In the lower court in England, the decision was in
Luther's favor, the court holding that the confiscation of the Luther plant and
its stocks was not an act of state since the Government of Russia had not been
recognized by England, and only a recognized government can commit an act
of state. On appeal, however, this decision was reversed and the title of Sagor,
based upon the sale to him by Russia, was upheld and Luther's plea rejected.
The court held that the confiscatory decree nationalizing all the property in
Russia, when executed on the lumber in Russia, was a proper decree, the results
of which the courts of England would recognize. The appeal court had permitted
new evidence on the one issue-whether or not England had recognized the
Soviet Government as the lawful Government of Russia. The court found this
new evidence showed that the Government had recognized the Soviet Govern-
ment as the lawful Government of Russia, and the court, therefore, recognized
the confiscation decree as a valid act of state. The decision was unanimous,
several judges giving concurring opinions. One judge said:
The Court is asked to ignore the law of the foreign country under which the vendor
acquired his title, and to lend its assistance to prevent the purchaser dealing with the
goods. I do not think that any authority can be produced to support the contention.s7
Another judge said:
It is well settled that the validity of the acts of an independent sovereign govern-
ment in relation to property and persons within its jurisdiction cannot be questioned
in the Courts of this country .... 5
6. Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz, [1929] 1 K.B. 718 (C.A.).
Facts. The plaintiff was the widow of the Grand Duke Paul of Russia.
The princess had fled from her residence, the Paley palace in Russia, and it
and its contents were seized by the Soviets, and part of the contents were sold.
The defendant Weisz purchased some of the art previously contained in
the Paley palace, some for himself and some as an agent for other persons.
On finding that the articles were to be sold in England, the princess, who had
fled from Russia, brought an action for their recovery.
Contention and Decision. The lower court found that Weisz had acquired title
and that the Princess Paley had lost title to the goods. On the appeal, three
judges gave their opinions seriatum and, basing their holdings on the act of
state doctrine, upheld the lower court.
Lord Justice Scrutton said:
Our Government has recognized the present Russian Government as the de jure
Government of Russia, and our Courts are bound to give effect to the lays and acts
87. [19211 3 K.B. at 545 (Bankers, L.J.).
88. Id. at 54S (Warrington, LJ.).
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of that Government so far as they relate to property within that jurisdiction when
it was affected by those laws and acts.8 9
The concurrence of one judge appeared to be couched in more restricted lan-
guage.
This court will not inquire as to the legality of acts done by a foreign government
against its own subjects in respect to property situated in its own territory 00
It was such a statement which the court of Aden (in the Rose Mary
case) narrowly construed to hold that an act of state, however wicked,
if directed only against citizens of that country which created the act,
must be recognized; but if it related to the person or property of for-
eigners, foreign courts might ignore it. This was the misconstruction
of the court of Aden which was corrected in the English Court of
Chancery opinion in the Wagg case. The Court of Chancery of England
construed both the Luther v. Sagor and the Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz
opinions as laying down a universal rule that an executed act of state
of a foreign country will be recognized in England as valid in the foreign
country, whether or not it is directed against citizens of that country or
foreigners, even if it be contrary to international law.
D. Those English Cases Involving a Foreign Act of State Affecting
Obligations of a Contract Rather Than Title to Property
Certain English cases relate to an act of state of a foreign country
which did not purport or attempt to confiscate property, but did attempt
to prevent performance of a contract made and to be performed in another
country. This phase of an act of state was not considered in the Sabbatino
case, and was not discussed in any of the cases involving Iranian oil, but
foreign cases involving this problem were cited in the Sabbatino deci-
sions.
Reference to a United States Court's Determination in This Field
Before reviewing the English cases which involved an act of state
creating a breach of a foreign contract, we should turn briefly to United
States sources to establish our measuring rod as to what United States
courts have held in such cases. United States courts recognize as valid
the foreign act of state but give it no extraterritorial effect. The foreign
obligor of the contract remains liable, although the intention of such
an act of state is to relieve from liability. The principal United States
89. 11929] 1 K.B. at 725.
90. Id. at 736 (Russell, L.J.).
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case on this subject is Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Siemens
& Halske Aktiengesellschaftf1
Facts. In the time between the early 1920's and 1933, many German cor-
porations and municipalities borrowed money in the United States on an
issue of bonds. Usually an American bank was made trustee of such an issue
and funds for servicing the bonds were transmitted from time to time to the
trustee. In 1933, Germany, by law, refused to permit any of these German
companies, which were obligated to pay in dollars in New York, to have foreign
exchange with which to make these payments. A German institution was
created, known as the Konversionskasse. All companies having outstanding
dollar bonds were required to make payments to the Konversionskasse in the
equivalent amount of German marks for the obligations payable in the United
States in dollars. The United States trustees were without funds from that time
on to meet the payment of coupons and sinking fund on the bonds. The action
cited above (with other similar actions) was begun by the trustee against one
of the borrowing German companies in an effort to collect some of the unpaid
interest and other charges which should have been paid.
Contention and Decision. The German company defended the suit on the
ground that it was not in default. Under German law, it had paid the mark
equivalent of dollars due to the Konversionskasse. It was not its fault, it con-
tended, if Germany had refused to convert the mark and that its obligations
in the United States were therefore unpaid; under German law, the company,
a German company, had no liability. The United States court properly treated
this situation as a foreign act of state which had no effect upon the obligations
within the United States. The contract between the corporation issuing the
bonds on the one hand, and the trustee and bondholders on the other, was by
the terms of the contract to be due and payable in dollars in the United States.
Analysis and Discussion of Decision. Of course, not every refusal to pay or
otherwise to perform under a contract is a breach of contract. Such refusal to
pay or perform may be justified, and if justified, no liability exists for a breach
of contract. A conclusion that a wrongful act, a breach of contract, has occurred
is as much a conclusion of law as a determination of title to property; in both
instances it is a conclusion of law based upon evidentiary facts. As to a contract,
the court must decide whether the refusal to perform is wrongful or justified.
Here, the United States court held that the act of state by Germany was not a
defense to exonerate the companies from liability. Since the German act was
one of a foreign country intended to affect property within the United States, it
was ineffective for that purpose. The conclusion was that all of the German
companies which had dollar bonds in the United States were guilty of a breach
of contract and liable for the unpaid amounts with interest. The court said:
91. 15 F. Supp. 927 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 84 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299
U.S. 535 (1936).
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But as the contracts were made here and were to be performed here, the German law
relative to performance is of no legal significance in the courts of this country. By
our law the bonds were valid when issued; by our law there is no impossibility,
illegality, or other excuse for nonperformance, beyond the fact that payment in gold
coin is dispensed with.0 2
Two of the English cases cited in the Rose Mary decision were con-
tract cases of this type.
7. Wolff v. Oxholm, 6 M. & S. 92, 105 Eng. Rep. 1177 (K.B. 1817).
Facts. The oldest of the English contract cases involving consideration of an
act of state is that of Wolff v. Oxholm. Wolff, a naturalized British citizen, with
certain others, also British subjects, as an English partnership, was doing busi-
ness with Oxholm, a Dane. At the time in question the Dane was indebted to
the British partnership in the amount of over 6 21,000. By agreement, this
debt was for money advanced in England and was to bear interest at five per
cent. Oxholm defaulted and Wolff instituted suit in the proper court of Copen-
hagen for recovery of the amount due. In 1807, while this suit was pending, war
was declared between Great Britain and Denmark, and Denmark by an ordi-
nance of August 16, 1807 declared that all monies belonging to English subjects
were to be sequestered, and debtors were instructed to pay all debts due to
English subjects to the Danish Treasury. Payment was made by the defendant
to the Danish Treasury, but of course without knowledge or consent of the
English plaintiffs. No payment was made after the war by the Danish Treasury
to the Wolff partnership.
Contention and Decision. In 1814 Oxholm, the Dane, came to England where
he was arrested by the plaintiff for debt (this being a proceeding for the recovery
of debts in accordance with legal procedure in England at that time). The Dane
pleaded no liability because he had paid the debt to the Danish Treasury. Lord
Ellenborough rejected this plea and, after reviewing international law cases on
this subject and legal writers including Vatel, Grotius, Bynkershoek, and
Puffendorff, said:
Considering, therefore, that . . . such confiscation was not general at any period of
time, and that no instance of it, except the ordinance in question, is to be found for
something more than a century, we think our judgment would be pregnant of mis-
chief to future times, if we did not declare, that in our opinion this ordinance, and
the payment to the commissioners appointed under it, do not furnish a defence to the
present action . . . . The parties went into that Court expecting justice, according
to the then existing laws of the country, and are not bound by the quashing of their
suit, in consequence of a subsequent ordinance, not conformable to the usage of
92. 15 F. Supp. at 929. Judge Patterson, in making this statement, also quoted Judge
Learned Hand: "By the law of most civilized countries the legality of the performance of
a contract depends upon the law of the place of performance, and the contract is enforceable,
if lawful by the law of the place of making when made, and if the performance is lawful by
the law of the place of performance when due." Anglo Continentale Treuhand v. St. Louis
S.W. Ry., 81 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 655 (1936).
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nations, and which, therefore, they could not expect, nor are they or we bound
to regard.93
In spite of some quaint language, the parallel of this case with the
American cases involving German bonds sold in the United States and
to be serviced in the United States by the payment of dollars, which
an act of state in Germany prevented, is clear. The principle is the same.
A debt due and owing in one country is property in that country, col-
lectible in and subject to the laws of that country, and a foreign act
of state does not affect the obligation. An act of state of a foreign
country which in some way attempts to affect that property or lessen
its value is an act contrary to international law, and its extraterritoriality
will not be recognized. It is not a justifiable, but a arongfu , refusal
to pay; it creates a breach of contract.
8. in re Fried Krupp A.G., [1917] 2 Ch. 188.
The legal principles in the Krupp case are the same as those in the
Hanover Bank case, except that the events in Krpp occurred during
World War I instead of before World War II.
Facts. On September 30, 1914, a German ordinance was issued by the Federal
Council of Germany which forbade transmission of funds to "Great Britain and
Ireland or to the British colonies and foreign possessions." By German law,
payment of debts abroad was postponed and no interest was to accrue during
the period of postponement. Fried Krupp had owed a sum of money to 3.
Wild & Co. of England. However, Fried Krupp, a German company, refused to
pay interest, claiming in defense the German decree which forbade the payment
of interest during the period of postponement. The debt was payable in pounds
in England.
Contention and Decision. The English court pointed out that this was a con-
fiscatory measure in Germany, the result of which was to reduce the value of
the property in England (the right to receive from the German company the
whole face amount with the interest). The court stated that the ordinance
shall not constitute a defense
so far as it operates to extinguish all German liability for conventional interest, as being
one which is not conformable to the usage of nations, and which, therefore, 'Messrs.
Wild could not expect, and which neither they nor we are bound to regard .... 0
These contract cases cited in the Rose Mary case exemplify the
cardinal principle of the act of state doctrine as it relates to the in-
dependent sovereignty of each nation. If the American and English
courts in these cases had accepted the plea that the obligor was free of
liability, they would have been enforcing a foreign act of state contrary
93. 6 Al. & S. at 106, 105 Eng. Rep. at 11S2.
94. [1917] 2 Ch. at 194.
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to their own laws on contract debts in their own country to the detri-
ment of those persons who had contracted in accordance with United
States or English laws.
9. Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus Bros., [1888] 38 Ch. 348.
This is another contract case decided on the same principles as the
other contract cases. The English court recognized the validity of an
act of state of Peru. In this case it was to the advantage of a partner-
ship which was not a national of the country committing the act of
state. The case is significant also for collateral principles: (1) only a
sovereign government, usually only one duly recognized as such, can com-
mit an act of state, but an act of state committed by a recognized govern-
ment creates a liability on that country if the contract is subsequently
broken by the government of the country, even by a successor government;
(2) where a foreign sovereign is by contract obligated -to make payment
in England, an act of state of that foreign country will not be granted ex-
traterritorial effect in England though the other country's act of state
purports to change or modify the contract, for to do so would be to
enforce in England the laws of a foreign country, changing and super-
seding the English law. The only difference between the Republic of
Peru case and the preceding English cases and United States case (the
Hanover Bank case which is used as our measuring rod) is that the
obligors in the English and United States cases were foreign corpora-
tions whose contractual performance was prevented by an act of state
of their own country. They remained liable in the foreign country where
their contract was to be performed. In the Republic of Peru case, the
obligor was the sovereign itself.
Facts. The facts are somewhat complicated. Dreyfus Brothers was a French
organization carrying on business in Paris, making purchases and arranging
for shipments to various parts of the world. A long time before the case in
question arose, Dreyfus Brothers entered into a contract with the then existing
Government of Peru for the purchase of a large quantity of guano. A contro-
versy arose concerning the performance of the contract and before this com-
mercial controversy was settled war broke out between Peru and Chile in 1879.
While this war was in progress, one Nicolas de Pierola became dictator of
Peru. England recognized this person as the supreme ruler of Peru; his Gov-
ernment was also recognized de jure by France and other European states. While
Pierola was dictator of Peru, his government made a settlement with Dreyfus
Brothers in the controversy concerning the purchase and sale of guano. This
settlement was for an amount much less than the amount which Dreyfus had
claimed was due to the partnership on the contracts, but the partnership
accepted the settlement in full satisfaction of its claim.
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In 1886, some sLx years after the settlement, the dictator Pierola was deposed
and the Government which had been in power previous to his dictatorship once
again became the Government of Peru. During Pierola's dictatorship, Dreyfus
had continued to do further business with this government, but when the pre-
vious Peruvian Government came back into power, it attempted to repudiate
the earlier settlement between Pierola's Government and Dreyfus, as not being
sufficiently favorable, and sought to deprive Dreyfus of proceeds of shipments
currently being sent to the Dreyfus partnership in England on the ground that
Dreyfus owed additional funds in the old controversy, beyond those agreed to
by the partnership and the Government of Peru in the Pierola settlement. The
Government of Peru which had come back into power also insisted that its
interpretation of the old contract and repudiation of the settlement should be
governed by the laws of Peru, although it had brought the case against Dreyfus
in England.
Contention and Decision. Two questions arose in the English court: whether
the settlement of the controversy by Pierola's Government (an act of state)
was valid; and whether or not the repudiation of this settlement (act of state)
by the Peruvian Government which had come back into power should be
governed by the laws of Peru in a suit in England to collect funds in England.
The English court decided that it must recognize the validity of the act of
state by the Pierola Government. It decided further that the act of state by the
Peruvian Government which had come back into power had no extraterritorial
effect to change the terms of a contract made and to be performed in England
and therefore governed by the laws of England.
As to the first question listed above, the court said:
The short result of these facts is this. At the time when Sefior Pierola seized upon
the supreme power there was a question pending between Messrs. Dreyfus and the
Peruvian Government as to the result of the accounts of their dealings in guano under
the first contract. By art. 33 of that contract this question was to be settled by the
tribunals of Peru.95
It was the obligation of this contract which was the subject of the settlement.
On the suit of the Peruvian Government in England to recover funds due
and payable in England, English law governs. The court said as to the second
question:
It is difficult to see how this can be determined by the law of Peru. It is a question
of international law of the highest importance whether or not the citizens of a foreign
State may safely have such dealings as existed in this case with a Government which
such State has recognised [sic].06
10. liz re Helbert Wagg & Co., [1956] Ch. 323.
The chief importance of the Wagg case lies in its interpretation of
the laws of England in respect to the act of state doctrine: that the
95. [1MS] 3S Ch. at 355 (Emphasis omitted.)
96. Ibid.
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validity of a foreign act of state, even if in violation of international law,
is recognized by other governments, whether or not the sufferers from
that act of state are citizens of the country which committed it or are
foreigners, including Englishmen.
Facts. This is a contract case. In 1924 a German company entered into a loan
agreement with Helbert Wagg & Co. for £ 350,000 sterling. Repayment of
this loan, in accordance with the agreement, was to be made at various times
in London, free of German taxes, and in every respect, except one, was a loan
made and payment to be performed in London. That one exception was, as stated
specifically in the loan agreement, that the obligation was to be governed by
the laws of Germany. In 1933 came the German moratorium and payments on
the loan ceased. Later (1956), Wagg made a claim in England against the
German property fund on the ground that the company held a defaulted obliga-
tion of a German company which made them a proper claimant against that
fund.
Contention and Decision. The question whether or not the claim was a proper
one depended on whether or not the German obligation was in default. No
payments, of course, had been received since the moratorium of 1933.
The court held Wagg was not a proper claimant because the loan, under the
terms of the loan agreement, had not been defaulted. The parties had agreed
that the obligation was to be governed by German law. By German law, the
obligor company in Germany was not in default because it had made the proper
payments to the Konversionskasse. The court found that the German exchange
law which prevented payment of pounds sterling was a reasonable exercise
of government power and, since the agreement of the parties provided that
determination of the obligation should be by German law, that law was the law
to be enforced in England as to this one loan.
The court said:
In my judgment, this was foreign exchange control legislation which must be recog-
nized by this country as effective to modify contractual obligations where the proper
law is German.9 7
E. French Cases Which Did Not Involve an Executed Act of State
Cited as Authority in the Rose Mary Case
11. Union des R~publiques Socialistes Soviitiques v. Intendant Gdnd-
ral Bourgeois as Qualitg et Socit6 La Ropit, Cour de Cassation
(ch. req.), March 5, 1928, [1928] Sirey Recueil General I. 217,
Clunet 674 (1928), [1927-1928] Ann. Dig. 67 (No. 43) (Fr.)."
97. [1956] Ch. at 353-54. Cf. Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank, 304 N.Y. 533, 110
N.E.2d 6 (1953).
98. For a complete statement of the facts underlying the La Ropit case, see The Jupiter,
[1924] P. 236 (CA.); The Jupiter (No. 2), [1925] P. 69 (C.A.); The Jupiter (No. 3),
[1927] P. 122, appeal dismissed, [1927) P. 250 (C.A.). These cases, which concerned another
of the La Ropit ships which had escaped under the same conditions, are summarized In
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La Ropit case involved an unexecuted act of state.
Facts. The Soviet Ambassador to France asked the French courts to put him,
as representative of the U.R.S.S., in possession of certain ships in a French port.
He claimed title to these ships under a U.S.S.R. decree of January 26, 1918,
which had nationalized the merchant marine of which these ships had been
a part. In short, the Soviet Government asked the French courts to enforce
in France a Soviet act of confiscation which the Soviet Government had been
unable to enforce in Russia over a period of ten years.
Contention and Decision. The French courts refused. These particular ships,
the possession of which was sought by the Russian Ambassador, were the
property of an organization known as La Ropit and had been based at Odessa.
At the date of the U.S.S.R. decree and thereafter, until April 1919, the U.S.S.R.
had never exercised any governmental authority whatever over Odessa and its
surrounding area. In April 1919, the Ukrainian Soviet (which later became
part of the U.S.S.R.) gained governmental control of the Odessa area. But by
that time these ships were no longer there, nor in any other territorial waters
of the U.S.S.R., and never returned to such jurisdiction.
The ships had been seized once at Odessa by a short-lived local government
(unconnected with the forces which later became the U.S.S.R.); but a succeed-
ing government (Austrian) had returned the ships to La Ropit organization
(which had then been dissolved in Russia), after which they arrived in France
under control of the owners.
Under these circumstances, the courts in France refused to dispossess La
Ropit owners and, thus, refused to enforce the confiscation decree extraterri-
toriality as the U.S.S.R. Ambassador had requested.
United States courts have recognized the effects produced by an ex-
ecuted act of state within the country which commits it, but do not enforce
within the United States foreign acts of state which are contrary to
international law on property never subjected to such foreign act of
state. The decision in La Ropit case would be conventional in the United
States since the ships were in France, not Russia, and had never been
in the possession of this newly recognized Soviet Government.
12. Socigtj Potasas Ibericas v. Block:, Cour de Cassation (Ch. civ.),
March 14, 1939, [1939] Dalloz Hebdomadaire [hereinafter cited
as D. H.] I. 257, [1938-1940] Ann. Dig. 150 (No. 54) (Fr.).
[1925-19261 Ann. Dig. 136 (No. 100). Cf. Compania Espanola de Navewgadon Maritima,
S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 6S, 75-76 & n.1 (1933) (concerning Jupiter), and subequent
decisions in the same case, The Navemar, 24 F. Supp. 495 (E.D.N.Y. 1933), rev'd, 102 F.2d
444 (2d Cir. 1939). The issues became moot by recognition of a different Spanish govern-
ment and the return of the ship to private ownership. The Navemar, 103 F.2d 783 (2d Cir.
1939) (per curiam).
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13. Volatron v. Moulin, Cour d'Appel d'Aix, March 25, 1939, [1939]
D. H. I. 329, [1938-1940] Ann. Dig. 24 (No. 10) (Fr.).
These two cases, decided by different French courts, may be con-
sidered together, as the facts of each case are identical and the final de-
cision on the issues presented is the same; the decision of each of the
courts could apply equally to the other French case.
In both cases the decisions contain quotable statements which out of
their context and, unapplied to the specific facts, may easily be con-
strued as a repudiation of the validity of a foreign act of state-that
"no one in France shall be deprived of his property without due com-
pensation." Of course, the United States Constitution can be quoted
for the same fundamental principle. The application of that principle,
however, in relation to a foreign act of state, is relevant only if there
is before a court (including a United States court as in the Sabbatino
case) property seized abroad under an act of state, confiscatory in nature
and, therefore, contrary to international law and to the law of the
forum of the country where title is being tried. Of course, property in
France is subject to French law, as property under United States juris-
diction is protected by the Constitution.
In the two French cases above mentioned, the property before the
court (the title to which was claimed by two persons-one claiming
under an alleged confiscatory act of state and the other claiming a
continued ownership), the facts of the cases show once again that the
property had not been subjected to an executed act of state in a foreign
country. In these two cases, therefore, the issue of the validity of an
executed act of state did not arise. The act of state in the foreign
country was passed to validate a previous unauthorized seizure and
after the property had been brought to France and had been awarded
by the courts to the original owners.
Facts. The facts of both cases are to be read against the confusion of the
Spanish Civil War. The then existing Government of Spain, duly recognized
abroad, had been attacked by the forces under Franco. The existing Govern-
ment, being hard pressed, called for help from communist sources and came
at last to be called the People's Communist Front. The Province of Catalonia
was one which remained loyal to that Government. Within this province were
certain potash mines owned by a company known as the Soci~t6 Potasas Ibericas.
The majority of the directors and stockholders were not Spanish, but French
and Swiss. The operating office was, of course, in Spain, but the company was
controlled from Paris. The disruptive conditions of the Civil War caused the
company to cease operations and its principal personnel returned to France. The
Government of Catalonia, a local government-not the central Government of
Spain-passed certain decrees by which it ordered the immediate return to
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Spain of these persons who, as aforesaid, were not Spanish nationals. Because of
the physical danger of the situation in Spain, they did not return. Catalonia
had threatened, if the mines were not reopened, to "nationalize" them although
no decree expressing an act of state, no official expression of either the local-
much less the national-will was promulgated until later. However, to raise
some revenue, some of this potash was sent to France. The defendants in each
case, the holders of the bills of lading, were both Spaniards who claimed the
potash solely because they held the bills of lading. The potash was claimed by
the potash company, or by one claiming to act for the potash company, and in
both cases the property was ultimately awarded to the plaintiff, this claimant.
Contention and Decision. The report of Socit Potasas Ibcricas J. Bloch in the
Annual Digest states: "The facts of the case are not clear . . . ." ([1938-1940]
Ann. Dig. at 150.) However, by reference to both cases, significant dates
can be established. The plaintiff in both cases was really Potasas, though its
interests were represented in one case by Moulin. In the Block case, the ship-
ment of potash was sent from Barcelona October 10, 1936, and the bills of
lading covering it were indorsed in Paris October 15, 1936. ([1939] D.H.I. at
258.) The date of the shipment of the potash in the Volatron case does not
appear, but an injunction relating to that property was issued by a French court
lMlarch 1, 1937, proving that the shipment had arrived in Paris prior to that
date. (11939] D.H.I. at 329.) Volatron, who held the bill of lading, "refused
to reveal in what manner he came to possess the merchandise, from whom he
received it, and at what price." ([1939] D.H.I. at 329-30.)
As to the act of state confiscating the potash mines, the Government of
Spain at Valencia by a decree of April 24, 1937, temporarily nationalized the
mines in question. A comparison of the dates involved show that this was after
both shipments of Potash had arrived in France. The local government of
Catelonia by its decree of June 19, 1937, stated that the nationalization of
the mines should have retroactive effect to July 22, 1936. ([1939] D.H.I. at
258, and [1938-1940] Ann. Dig. at 152.) Then the plaintiff, the potash com-
pany in France, contended that the decrees of expropriation did not operate
in France and could not be allowed retroactive effect to cover the time when
the potash was still in Spain. The potash company also, of course, contended
that the decree of expropriation was invalid in France because of lack of com-
pensation, although the Valencia decree promised compensation. The higher
French court reversed the lower court decision in favor of the holder of the
bill of lading, and held that
"the retroactive character of such a provision cannot in respect of French law, affect
acquired rights, particularly regarding goods which have previously been landed in
French territory.'119
In the course of these cases, one of the arguments presented to the French
court was that as the potash company was a Spanish corporation and the act
of seizing the property was by Spain, no international question was presented
99. [1938-1940] Ann. Dig. at 152.
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to the French court; but the court rejected this argument, pointing out (because
of the ownership of the company) that its nationality was most doubtful and
that the nationality should be determined
"not only by their place of registration, but also according to the place of control
and to the ownership of their capital."' 00
(This part of the decision conforms to the decision of all three
United States courts in Sabbatino that although C.A.V. was a Cuban
corporation, it should be considered as a United States national since it
was predominantly owned by American citizens.)
Also the French courts questioned whether or not this was, for
other reasons, a true act of state (i.e., was it a recognized government;
was the seizure a proper one under the laws of a state?), saying:
"Further, it is impossible to discover with any certainty whether these measures
have been taken in conformity with the internal legislation of Spain and whether
they will be confirmed or annulled."' 0
In summarizing these two French cases, in language customary in
United States jurisprudence, the lower courts decided that the holder of
a bill of lading for goods shipped from a foreign country was entitled
to possession of the goods and this, in effect, supported the seizure of
the potash in Spain as an act of state, but, on appeal, and with strict
reference to the facts, the courts reversed, holding: that in absence
of a formal, properly executed act of state, the seizure of the potash
was without governmental authority whatever; that a retroactive act
of state, passed after the property was in France and no longer in the
possession of any one claiming it under Spanish law, failed to transfer
title to it; and that France would not enforce within France an unex-
ecuted retroactive act of state. These cases, too, are thus not in conflict
100. Moulin v. Volatron, Tribunal de Commerce de Marseille, May 25, 1937, [1938)
Sirey Recueil Gfnfral II. 105, [1938-1940] Ann. Dig. 191, 193 (No. 68), afi'd, [1939] D.I.
329, [1938-1940] Ann. Dig. 24 (No. 10) (Fr.).
101. [1938-1940] Ann. Dig. at 192. The countries of Europe taking a neutral position in
the Spanish Civil War were unwilling to commit themselves even as to the continuity of
recognition of the Spanish Loyalist Government. Compare:
No legal government resisting rebellion had ever been deprived of the right to import arms
for its own defense. Such an action would be tantamount to placing a premium on rebellion.
But in July 1936 all Europe was so tense that Leon Blum, Socialist Prime Minister of
France, feared that if the Spanish Republic received arms, the champions of the insurgents,
Germany and Italy, would use that as a pretext for unleashing a world war. Waiving precedent,
therefore, the French suggested that both sides be deprived of outside aid by a non-interven-
tion committee. Great Britain endorsed this move, as did nearly all the other powers. Ger-
many and Italy accepted, but of course with no intention of abiding by its decisions.
The Powers then constituted the Non-Intervention Committee. Soviet Russia joined It
but insisted that she would sustain the Spanish Loyalists if Germany and Italy were found
sustaining the Insurgents.
Wells, An Intelligent American's Guide to the Peace 130 (1945). This action was tantamount
to withdrawing recognition from the Loyalist Government.
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with the principles laid down by the United States Supreme Court in
Sabbatino.
Of course all confiscatory acts of the Peoples' Front Government were
annulled when the revolutionary forces of Franco triumphed and were
recognized as the legitimate Government of Spain.
F. French Cases Cited by the Courts in the Sabbatino Case, but Not
Relied on in the Rose Mary Case
All of the other French cases cited by the United States courts in
the Sabbatino case also clearly support the act of state doctrine.
14. Larrasquits et l'Etat Espagnol v. Socikt Cemnctos Rezola, Cour
d'Appel de Poitiers, Dec. 20, 1937, [1938] Sirey Recueil GnCral
III. 68, [1935-1937] Ann. Dig. 196 (No. 71) (Fr.).
Facts. A company by the name of Cementos, claiming to be the owners of the
ship Itxas-Zurri, procured the legal arrest of that ship then in the French port
of La Rochelle. The ship's captain, Juan Larrasquitu, claimed on behalf of the
Spanish Government that the ship belonged to the Spanish state, and not to
Cementos, having been properly requisitioned.
Contention and Decision. The courts of France (Civil Tribunal of La Rochelle
and Court of Appeals of Poitiers) found that there was a decree of the Spanish
Government requisitioning for national service all merchant ships of the Regis-
ter of Guipuzcoa; that this had been properly passed and duly published in the
official journal of the Spanish Government; that the ship in question did belong
to the Register of Guipuzcoa; and that the captain of the ship, while the ship
was lying in a Spanish port (Santander), duly received notice of this requisition.
The courts of France found that the ship had been duly requisitioned and that
the requisition, therefore, had immediate effect. They refused to recognize the
claim of Cementos and recognized the title of the Spanish Government. The
Court of Appeals of Poitiers said:
"The French jurisdiction is incompetent to consider the regularity of the act of
a foreign sovereign, for that would be to judge that act. The Spanish courts alone
have the right to decide if the requisition conforms to Spanish law. Nor can Frenchjustice examine whether the requisition did or did not transfer onership. It is
necessary and it is enough that there has been a requisition, and that no doubt
exists as to its character as a governmental act."" 2
The French courts recognized the validity of an executed act of
state, but gave no extraterritoriality to an unexecuted act of state. This
is exactly the act of state as it is enforced in United States courts.' 3
102. [1935-1937] Ann. Dig. at 197.
103. For accuracy it might be well to mention that while using the name of this cas,
the court of appeals in the Sabbatino case refers--, 307 F.2d at S55 n.6, to a different page
and, thus, to the case of Agusquiza v. Socit Sota y Aznar, Tribunal Civil d Bordeaux,
Sept. 3, 1937, [193S] Sirey Recueil G~ndral 111. 65, [1935-1937] Ann. Dig. 195 (No. 70)
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15. Socijt Hardmuth, Cour d'Appel de Paris, Dec. 2, 1950, 44 Revue
critique de Droit International Priv6 501 (No. 1) (1955) (Fr.).
Facts. L. et C. Hardmuth was a general partnership doing business under the
laws of Czechoslovakia, with its principal factory established in Ceske Budejo-
vicz (Budweis), Czechoslovakia. The partnership manufactured "Koh I Noor"
pencils. The company was nationalized by the Government of Czechoslovakia
on October 27, 1945. In 1950 various members of the partnership, declaring
themselves to be the sole owners of the partnership, came to France and there
formed a limited liability company, "Soci~t6 Hardmuth," under French law,
claiming all the assets of the L. et C. Hardmuth company in France. Shortly
thereafter, one Mechura, acting as the Director of the nationalized Czechoslova-
kian enterprise, came to France and claimed as assets of the nationalized com-
pany in Czechoslovakia all the property held by the new French company in
France.
Contention and Decision. The French court found that the assets in France,
consisting of a building, certain available supplies and an automobile, had
belonged to the Czechoslovakian company at the time of nationalization. It also
found that a few patents and trademarks had been registered after the Czech-
oslovakian Government confiscation. The French court applied the act of state
doctrine. Of course, the French court had no jurisdiction over the assets in
Czechoslovakia. It held:
[T]his nationalization has the character of an expropriation and cannot, in principle,
have any effect outside of the territory of Czechoslovakia . . . . French laws on
nationalization themselves provide that they do not apply to foreign assets of the
affected enterprises .... 104
This statement of the French courts was in accordance with the provisions of
the Franco-Czechoslovakian Agreement of May 1, 1950. The French court then
held that the assets in France did not belong to the nationalized company in
Czechoslovakia. The court appeared to be in doubt whether or not certain of
the intangible assets, as trade marks and the like, were assets of the nationalized
company or not, and referred this matter to an administrator.
Thus, the court refused to recognize any extraterritorial effect of the
nationalization decree, but did recognize the transfer of assets in Czech-
(Fr.), which may be the case which the district court intended to mention. In this case, a
ship, the Arno-Mendi, while lying at the French port of Bordeaux, was claimed by Sota y
Aznar. The facts showed, however, that, although claimed by the Basque Provincial Govern-
ment under what it insisted was a government requisition decree, its claim was defective
for two reasons: (1) the court held only the Spanish Government could create an act of
state (the Basque Government was a government of a province), and (2) the ship was In
Bordeaux, France, when requisitioned.
The French court held that the Spanish decree was a nullity in France: "The decree In
question could not be given and was not intended to have extraterritorial operation." Ibid.
The court, while recognizing the international force of a decree of Spanish Government, said:
"'The decisions of the Basque Government cannot be imposed on foreign nations.'" Ibid.
104. 44 Revue critique de Droit International Priv6 at 502.
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oslovakia. It was consistent, therefore, to recognize that the persons
from Czechoslovakia who had come to France and had formed the
French corporation owned the assets in France.
The principle is clear-the French courts recognized that the title
to all property under the jurisdiction of Czechoslovakia held by the part-
nership had been transferred by the nationalization decree to the Gov-
ernment of Czechoslovakia. Property outside of Czechoslovakia at the
time of the nationalization decree had not been affected.
Thus the Franco-Czechoslovakian Agreement of 1950, as interpreted
by the French courts, confirmed the act of state doctrine as defined
and administered by United States courts.
16. Martin v. Banque d'Espagne, Cour de Cassation, Nov. 3, 1952,
[1952] Int'l L. Rep. 202 (No. 42), 42 Revue critique de Droit
International Priv6 425 (1953) (Fr.).
Facts. The plaintiffs (and appellants) claimed to have acquired in France,
in 1936, 180,000 pesetas in Spanish bank notes. However, these notes were not
accompanied by an export permit from Spain as required by the Spanish
Republican Government. Also in November 1936, the Nationalist Government
of General Franco required that all notes be stamped and exchanged for new
notes. These new notes he would recognize as legal tender. Later, the Govern-
ment of General Franco was recognized by France as the lawful Government
of Spain.
The appellants took their notes and presented them, but without export
permits, to a customs office at the Spanish border, which office, after first re-
fusing to accept the notes, did so and issued a receipt. However, the appellants
never received any new notes in exchange. The appellants then went to the
French court and sued the Bank of Spain in France for the recovery of the sum.
The Bank of Spain entered a plea that the French court had no jurisdiction over
the matter.
Contention and Decision. The French court of first instance granted the Bank
of Spain's plea of lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the stamping of the
notes-without which they were no longer valid-and their exchange for
notes which were legal tender was an exercise of sovereignty of the Spanish
State and the Bank of Spain was entitled to immunity from French jurisdiction.
The French Court of Appeals upheld the lower court, confirming the dismissal
of the action on two grounds: (1) a lack of jurisdiction of the French courts;
and (2) the stamping and exchange of notes was an act of state, saying:
"In the circumstances of this present case the Bank was merely an agent of the
Spanish State exercising its public authority. Accordingly, the acts in question, even
apart from the principle of immunity from jurisdiction, were public acts w.'hich are
not subject to judicial control in France."1 0o
105. [1952] Int'l L. Rep. at 202.
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17. De Keller v. Maison de la Pensge Francaise, Tribunal Civil de la
Seine, July 12, 1954, [1955] Int'l L. Rep. 21, 44 Revue critique
de Droit International Priv6 503 (1954) (Fr.).
Facts. One S., a Russian citizen until 1918, had owned a picture gallery in
Moscow. On November 5, 1918, a decree of the Russian Government nation-
alized this gallery; i.e., this picture gallery was henceforth to be state property.
S. subsequently left Russia and died in Paris in 1936. The defendant, Maison
de la Pens6e Francaise, was about to hold an exhibition in Paris, in 1954, and
exhibit some of the pictures which had formerly been part of S.'s art gallery
in Moscow. Heirs and other representatives of the estate of S. in Paris asked for
an order of sequestration from the French court so as to enable the plaintiff
subsequently to institute proceedings in France for determination of the owner-
ship of the pictures.
Contention and Decision. The French court refused to grant the order and,
after pointing out that the true defendants in the case would include the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, the court stated:
"All these difficulties would require us to answer important questions which this
Court cannot do without prejudging the admissibility of the main action and the
question as to whether the French courts are entitled to exercise jurisdiction over
it. For these reasons we decline to make the order of sequestration for which the
plaintiffs ask."' 0 6
Thus the court, by abstaining from jurisdiction and refusing to adjudi-
cate, recognized the validity of the act of state of Russia in confiscating
the gallery in Moscow.
G. The Greek Case
18. Case No. 1268/1937, Court of First Instance of Piraeus. °T
One Greek case is mentioned which may be identified as Case No.
1268/1937, decided by the court of first instance of Piraeus. The cita-
tion to this case by the Greek court's number and date is not given in
the opinions in the Sabbatino case. Reference is made there only to a
magazine article about this case by a Greek writer. 08 But a reading
and examination of the actual decision of the Greek court shows this
case to involve requisition decrees of the Spanish Government during
the Spanish civil war. United States and British courts had to make
similar determinations in regard to requisitioning decrees of the Spanish
Government. At an earlier time the same question arose under efforts
of the Soviet Russian Government to confiscate ships. The Greek deci-
sion in this case and the decisions in the United States, British and
106. [1955) Int'l L. Rep. at 22-23.
107. 4 EPHEMERIS TON HELLENON NOMIKON 560-61 (Athens 1937).
108. Massouridis, The Effects of Confiscation, Expropriation, and Requisition by a
Foreign Authority, 3 Revue Hellenique de Droit International 62 (1950).
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French courts are all consistent in regard to the act of state as it
applies to ships. None deny the validity of an act of state. Some found
that, on the facts before the court, there had been no execution of the
act of state on the particular ship, the title to which was claimed both
by the confiscating government and by the one who claimed continuing
ownership after the act of state.
In all of the cases involving the confiscation of ships, the first ques-
tion to be answered is: Was the attempted confiscation an act of state?
If it was by a recognized government, it was an act of state and was valid
within that government's own territory. Sometimes a court found that
the act was not by a recognized government or was merely by a local
government lacking sovereignty. The second and more important ques-
tion in these cases is: Where was the ship and was there an execution
of the act of state on that ship? When the ship was seized within the
territory of the confiscating government, the government's title to that
ship was recognized. But when there was no executed act of state and
the owner prior to the issuance of the act of state claimed the ship,
his continuing title was recognized. The Greek case is consistent with
all other similar cases.
Facts. The names of the parties in the Greek case are omitted; only the
name of the ship is given. This ship, the Inocencio Figaredo, flying the Spanish
flag, was lying in the Greek port of Piraeus. A creditor of the Spanish Popular
Front Government sought to attach the ship as property of this Spanish Govern-
ment. His effort to place this ship under judicial control was for two purposes-
to secure jurisdiction over the Spanish Popular Front, and to hold property
of the Spanish Popular Front to satisfy his hoped for judgment. He claimed
against this government of Spain for losses due, as alleged, from a breach of
contract between him and the Spanish Popular Front, suffered by the latter's
failure to fulfill the terms of a contract to charter the petitioner's own steam-
ship. He also served a court process on the Spanish ambassador in Greece.
Contention and Decision. The court decided two preliminary questions. One:
Did Greek courts have judicial right to adjudicate the rights in a commercial
contract where a foreign sovereign was a party to a contract and alleged to be
the one at fault? The court found that a sovereign had no immunity from com-
mercial contract if jurisdiction could be obtained, nor could the foreign sovereign
plead sovereign immunity. The second preliminary question was: Could juris-
diction be obtained in a Greek court over any foreign government by personal
service on its ambassador? The court held that such service was not valid to
bring the Spanish Government before the Greek court. The court had jurisdiction
only if the attachment against the ship in Piraeus was valid.
The case, therefore, resolved on the one main question: Was this ship the
property of the Spanish Popular Front Government? No one appeared for the
Spanish Popular Front Government and no claim was made on its behalf
except by the creditor of that Government. He claimed that the ship had been
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requisitioned by a governmental decree. There was no doubt that such a decree
had been promulgated and that it was intended to apply to all ships of the
Spanish merchant marine. The immediate question was, however, had this
decree ever been executed on this ship; had the ship ever been seized by anyone
acting on behalf of the Spanish Government? The captain of the steamship
intervened in behalf of the owner and showed that the owner was not in Spain
and that he, the captain, had acted for that owner and no one else. The Greek
court held:
"Furthermore it is not established that this ship has in fact been confiscated by
the Spanish Government and is now in possession of the Spanish Government."' 0 0
In short, the Greek court conventionally refused to enforce extraterritorially a
confiscation decree which the confiscating government bad not been able to
enforce within its own territory.
The Greek writer, whose magazine article is cited by the Supreme
Court in the Sabbatino case,"0 has obviously relied upon a dicta and has
coupled this case with La Ropit case which he misinterpreted. But
he admits that a solution of non-recognition of the validity of an ex-
ecuted act of state (as the lower courts did in the Sabbatino case) would
be an exception contrary to Greek law. He stated:
[T]he application of the foreign rule in this country does not shock the fundamental
rules on expropriation since this deprivation of property against the imperative rules
of the Greek Constitution took place abroad and the Greek Judge applying the
foreign law does not create now, for the first time, an opposition to public policy
but merely recognizes a "fait accompli" in front of which he finds himself. A contrary
solution of the problem would cause serious trouble."'
H. English Cases Cited by the Courts in Sabbatino, but Not Relied
on in the Rose Mary Case
19. Blad v. Bamfield, 3 Swans. 605, 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (Ch. 1674).
The United States Supreme Court in its opinion in the Sabbatino case
cited this case as authority for "the classic American statement of the
act of state doctrine, which appears to have taken root in England as
early as 1674 .... ,11
Facts and Decision. Blad, a Dane, seized property in Iceland of certain English
subjects who were endeavoring to carry on fishing operations there. At some
time later, Blad came to England and was arrested for his acts in seizing this
English property. He proved he had done these acts under letters patent from
the King of Denmark, and asked the English Chancery Court for a perpetual
109. Supra note 107, at 561.
110. 376 U.S. at 422 n.21.
111. Massouridis, supra note 108, at 67-68.
112. 376 U.S. at 416.
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injunction restraining proceedings against him in England for any seizure
in Iceland sanctioned by the Danish authorities. This injunction was granted.
The similarity of this case on its facts and decision with the United
States case of Underhill v. Hernandez"3 must at once be apparent. The
act of state of Denmark, directed against English subjects and their
property, was upheld as valid exercise of sovereign power within the
sovereign's territory.
20. West Rand Cent. Gold Mining Co. v. The King, [1905] 2 K.B.
391.
Facts. The West Rand Central Gold Mining Company, Limited, was an English
corporation which owned and worked a gold mine in the Transvaal, while that
area in Africa was an independent state known as the South African Republic.
On October 2, 1899, a quantity of gold owned by the West Rand company
was in transit by train from Johannesburg to Capetown, the destination being
a city under British sovereignty. Before the shipment had left the confines of
the South African Republic, the resident magistrate of the district through which
the shipment was then passing took possession of it. He acted under instructions
of the state's attorney for the Republic, who ordered him to take the gold
into safekeeping. Nine days after this event, war was declared between the
British Government and the South African Republic. Great Britain was vic-
torious and annexed the whole area, which had previously been an independent
state. The gold mining company never received the shipment; in fact, there is
no evidence in the case to show what became of it.
On this statement of facts, the gold mining company secured in England a
petition of right against the British Government (against the King), alleging
that the British Government, as the successor to the South African Republic,
was liable to it for the gold which the gold mining company had shipped but
which had never arrived at its destination.
It is difficult to determine why this case was cited in a Sabbatino
decision or to determine what proposition of law it was intended to
prove or illustrate. The petition of right was obviously based upon the
assumption that the South African Republic was liable to the gold
mining company for the value of the shipment and that the British
by conquering the country had assumed this obligation. All that was
known about this shipment was that it was stopped by an official of
the then South African Republic. There may be some doubt that this was
indeed "an act of state," for the authority of the official was never
discussed in the case and what happened to the gold is not stated.
Decision. The question then was: Was a succeeding government liable for gold
destined for a city under British sovereignty, the shipment of which had been
stopped by an official of, at that time, another sovereign government but at the
113. 16s U.S. 250 (iS97).
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time of the suit a part of the British empire? The British court decided in this
case that the King (the British Government) had no liability to the West Rand
Company.
Comparing this case with Sabbatino, one cannot find the issues to be
the same. In the gold mining case, the question was not who held title
to the gold. It seems to have been generally admitted that it belonged
to the gold mining company. Title to the sugar was the issue in the
Sabbatino case. In the gold mining case, the English court was not asked
to declare an act of state of a then defunct government to be null and
void-validity of an act of state was the issue in the Sabbatino case.
Liability of the South African Republic was assumed; liability of a suc-
ceeding government was questioned. No such issue arose in Sabbatino.
To search for a reason why this case would be considered an authority
for anything in Sabbatino, we may look to textbooks which have dis-
cussed the West Rand case. Dickinson, in his case book, The Law oj
Nations, classified the case under the titles "Succession in the Law of
Nations""n 4 and "Nature and Authority of the Law of Nations.""'
Brierly cites it for two purposes-one in definition of international law:
"'Whatever has received common consent of civilized nations must have
received the assent of our country.. . .' ""' This is certainly conventional
United States law also. Brierly next cites the case for the question, which
he finds difficult to answer, as to how far an annexing state takes over
the contractual liabilities of a state whose territory it annexes." 7 Con-
fiscation was not mentioned by either Brierly or Dickinson, which was,
of course, the main problem in the Sabbatino case.
The West Rand Mining Company case decided merely that a con-
quering country does not under international law guarantee to right
every wrong or to fulfill every obligation of the conquered country (or
in default thereof to respond in damages).
I. The Singapore Case
21. N.V. de Batsafsche Petroleum Maatschappij v. War Damage
Comm'n, Ct. App. Singapore, [1956] Int'l L. Rep. 810.
This case is wholly irrelevant in any discussion of the act of state,
for no act of state whatever was involved.
Facts. During the Second World War, Japan, as the aggressive invader, was
for a time in possession of parts of the Dutch East Indies. There, certain Dutch
companies had oil concessions. The occupying military power of Japan exploited
114. Dickinson, The Law of Nations 943 (1st ed. 1929).
115. Id. at 62.
116. Brierly, The Law of Nations 84 (5th ed. 1961).
117. Id. at 146.
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some of these concessions, and some of the oil from them was traced to storage
tanks in Singapore after the Japanese had been driven out both from the then
Dutch East Indies and Singapore. The question was: Did this oil belong to
Japan or to the three Dutch companies which had joined together to claim it
(the evidence showed that the oil could only have come from one or more of
these three concessions)? At no time had the Dutch Government, the local
government of Singapore, the British Government, or the United States Gov-
ernment recognized Japan either de facto or de jure as the government of the
invaded area where the oil wells were.
Decision. Only a recognized government can commit an act of state. The
legitimacy of title of any goods seized in a conquered country by a temporarily
occupying foreign power is governed by the laws of war and not by any civil
rules. Of course, this seizure of the Dutch oil was pure larceny and, of course,
did not transfer title. The oil was, therefore, delivered to the three Dutch com-
panies, instead of being seized by Singapore as Japanese property and sold for
the benefit of war claims.118
J. The One Belgian Case (Mexican Oil)
The Iranian nationalization of oil concessions was not the first time
a government had nationalized an oil concession. Mexico had done this
before. Let us, therefore, follow shipments of oil from Mexico claimed
by Mexico under its nationalization decree. Five cases involving ship-
ments of oil from Mexican oil fields after nationalization are cited by the
three United States courts in the Sabbatiho case. Four of these cases
cited are by courts of The Netherlands and one by a court of Belgium.
Of the five cases, the lower courts in one of them held that Mexico had
not, by its nationalization decree, acquired title to a shipload of oil
because, the court held, the Mexican law applied to real property only,
and not to oil. This lower court's decision was promptly reversed by the
higher court which found the act of state applied to the oil as well as
to the land. The final decision in this case, and all of these other cases,
supported the act of state doctrine. A brief review of each of the Mexican
oil cases follows.
22. "Propetrol," "Petroservice," et "Petrokest" v. Compania 1liexicano
de Petroleo & Tankage & Transport, Civil Tribunal of Antwerp,
Feb. 21, 1939, [1939] Belgique Judicaire II. 12, [1938-1940] Ann.
Dig. 25 (No. 11) (Bel.).
This case apparently involved several shipments of the Mexican oil
which were treated together as one case in the Annual Digest reports.
11S. This is governed by the Hague Conventions of 1907, including Convention IV to
which is annexed the rules of land warfare. See 1 Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, International
Acts, Protocols and Agreements Between the United States of America and Other Powers
1776-1909, 2269 (1910).
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"In the case of 'Propetrol,' 'Petroservice' and 'Petrolest' v. Compania Mexicano
de Petroleo and Tankage and Transport, the Civil Tribunal of Antwerp held . . .
that a decree of the Mexican government expropriating without compensation in-
stallations, etc., belonging to foreign oil companies in Mexico, could not be questioned
in a Belgian court on the ground that it violated the principles of Belgian public order.
An application to allow the seizure of oil cargoes exported from Mexico which had
been confiscated in this manner and were lying in port at Antwerp was rejected."1"
K. The Dutch Cases
23. United States of Mexico v. Batsajsche Petroleum Maatschappij,
Dist. Ct. Middleburg, Aug. 2, 1938 [1938] W. & N.J. No. 790,
[1919-1942] Ann. Dig. 16 (No. 7) (Neth.).
Facts. After nationalizing the oil concessions, Mexico had shipped to The
Netherlands a cargo of oil in the steamship Lundgress. In a suit challenging
Mexico's ownership of this oil under its nationalization decree, the Dutch
court found that the oil in question originated from oil fields formerly the
property of the Mexican Eagle Company (El Aguila), a Mexican corporation,
which was a subsidiary of the Batsafsche Petroleum Maatschappij, a Dutch
corporation. This Dutch corporation placed the oil brought in the Lundgress
under judicial restraint, as the property of its subsidiary, to collect the debt
due from that subsidiary to the Batsafsche parent company. The Mexican
Government, claiming title, sought to release the attachment. To the Mexican
Government's claim, Batafsche interposed three contentions: (1) that the
Mexican expropriation law of 1936 was unconstitutional; (2) that the Mexi-
can decree of 1938 was in turn inconsistent with the said law; (3) that the
Mexican expropriation measures were contrary to Dutch public order.120
Decision. The Dutch court rejected these contentions and by vacating the
attachment permitted the Mexican Government to take possession. In answering
the three objections to Mexico's claim of title, the court said:
"(1) The defendant [Batsafsche], in attacking the constitutionality of the Mexi-
can Law of 1936, asks for a decision, which is outside the competence of the Court. A
Dutch Court is not allowed to put the laws enacted by the claimant as a foreign
state to the test of its constitution. The Court is not entitled in the case under con-
sideration to enter into an examination and to judge the constitutionality of the
Mexican Expropriation Law of 1936.
"(2) The Court is not qualified to examine whether and how far decrees of
the Executive of a foreign State are legally valid and, therefore, in this case, to
extend its inquiry to the question whether the provisions of the Expropriation Law
have been correctly observed in the Presidential Decree of 1938. So far as the Court
has been able to ascertain, the claimant government has applied in respect of the
Mexican Eagle the provisions of its Expropriation Law even as far as the fore-
shadowed idemnification is concerned.
"(3) The Court rejects the defendant's plea that the provisions of the Mexican
law ought to be left without application as being contrary to Dutch 'public order.'
119. [1938-1940] Ann. Dig. at 25. (Italics omitted.)
120. [1919-1942] Ann. Dig. at 17.
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The Court does not feel at liberty to rule that the said provisions are at variance vith
what should be considered proper and permissible for a foreign legislature."' 21
On further appeal, this case was affirmed.
24. Petroservice & Credit Minier Franco-Rounmain V. El Agzdla, Ct.
App. The Hague, Dec. 4, 1939, [1939] W. & N.J. No. 115, aff'd on
other grounds, Court of Cassation, Feb. 7, 1941, [1941] W. & N.J.,
[1919-1942] Ann. Dig. 17 (Neth.).
Facts. In this case a certain quantity of oil had been sold by Mexican Gov-
ernment authorities to a French company which had in turn sold it to another
French company, the plaintiff in this action. The same claimant as in the
previous case, El Aguila, a Mexican company and the subsidiary of the Dutch
company, judicially seized the oil in The Netherlands on the ground that the
oil was its own property.
Decision. The lower court (District Court of Rotterdam) held that El Aguila
still held title on the ground that the Mexican e.propriation decrees related
to real property only. The Court of Appeals at the Hague promptly reversed,
holding that the El Aguila was a company under Mexican law, and the whole
act of expropriation took place within the sphere of the national sovereignty
of Mexico. The Court of Appeals said
"that a Dutch Court is not allowed to enter into an appreciation of the legality
of the acts of the Mexican Government under consideration, but that it is bound
to respect any juridical relations which might have arisen in the State of Mexico
from measures taken by that State in respect of property situated in its territory
and belonging to a Mexican Company. A Dutch Court is obliged to refrain from
entering into an independent examination of the validity or invalidity of public
acts of a foreign government."' 2
The Dutch Court of Cassation affirmed on the technical grounds that it could
not review a decision except where the issue in the appeal was the proper ap-
plication of Dutch law.
25. Dairs et Cy. v. El Aguila, Dist. Ct. Rotterdam, July 31, 1939 [1939]
W. & N.J. No. 747, [1919-1942] Ann. Dig. 19 (Neth.).
Facts. Here the claimants again were the buyers of the oil which had been
attached by El Aguila on the ground that the oil belonged to it. The action
was to vacate the judicial process permitting the oil to go to the buyers and,
thus, affirm the title by the Mexican Government which had sold the oil to
Dairs et Cy.
Decision. In vacating the judicial restraint, the District Court of Rotterdam
said:
"The defendant has argued that this was not a regular expropriation, but a confisca-
tion, and has pointed out that not only the Governments of the United States and
121. Ibid.
122. Id. at 18.
1965]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the United Kingdom, but also the Netherlands Government protested against what
had happened. There is, however, a profound difference between a diplomatic note,
addressed by a sovereign government to another in order to suggest to the latter,
on various grounds, the revision of a decision taken, in the interest of its nationals,
and the judgment of a Court calling in question the good faith of a foreign govern-
ment in the performance of one of its public acts. . . . It is up to the defendant
as a Mexican company-as it is, indeed, engaged in doing-to bring about a decision
of the Mexican judiciary on the legality of the expropriation measures which it
challenged. The Court is not in a position to do anything else but to admit its
legality for the time being. '123
26. Davis et Cie v. Mexican Eagle Co., Ct. App. Rotterdam, 41 Bulletin
de l'Institut Juridique International 256 (1940), [1938-1940] Ann.
Dig. 25 (No. 12) (Neth.).
Facts. The following is the complete report of this case as it appears in the
Annual Digest.
In this case the Court of Rotterdam set aside the arrest, effected by the Mexican
Eagle Company, of a quantity of oil sold by the Mexican Government to Davis &
Co. and brought by them to Holland. The Mexican Eagle Company contended that
the Mexican Government came into the possession of the oil as the result of decrees
of expropriation which in fact amounted to confiscation and was, as such, contrary
to Dutch conceptions of public policy. The Court held that it was not within its
province to question the good faith of a foreign Government in the performance of
acts of a public law nature.124
The decisions of the Dutch courts relating to the confiscation of the
Mexican oil concessions are both brief and clear. The Dutch courts
recognized the validity of the act of state of Mexico. They held that the
confiscation of the oil fields within the national domain of Mexico trans-
ferred to an agency of the Mexican Government, as intended by Mexican
law, the title to those oil wells and the oil which had been extracted from
them. The considerations that Dutch interests were adversely affected
failed to deter the court from pronouncing that the Government of Mexico
had taken title to a Mexican company wholly owned by Dutch nationals.
There are some, however, who have claimed that a different rule was
adopted by Dutch courts in respect to the act of state doctrine when the
Indonesian Government began oppressive tactics against Dutch com-
panies in Indonesia, tactics which were followed ultimately by the outright
confiscation of all Dutch-owned assets in Indonesia. These oppres-
sive measures-ultimately confiscation-were made in an effort by Indo-
nesia to persuade, or force, the Netherlands Government to give up its
sovereignty over Dutch New Guinea and to recognize Indonesia he-
gemony over that area. The case most often cited-but erroneously, as a
123. Id. at 19.
124. [1938-1940) Ann. Dig. at 25-26.
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detailed study of the case will show-as one in which the Dutch courts,
abandoning their former principles, refused to recognize the validity in
Indonesia of an Indonesian act of state, follows.
27. Senewbahl Maatschappij N.V. v. Bank Indonesia & Twentschc Bank
N.V., Dist. Ct. Amsterdam, Dec. 22, 1958, [1959] Nederlandse
Jurisprudentie 218 (No. 73), 7 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Inter-
nationaal Recht [hereinafter cited as N.T.I.R.] 285 (1960), aft'd,
Ct. Apps. Amsterdam, June 4, 1959, [1959] Nederlandse Juris-
prudentie 855 (No. 350), 7 N.T.I.R. 400 (1960) (Neth.).l -
Although this case has been cited frequently for the proposition that
Dutch courts refuse to recognize the validity of a foreign act of state
within the very country which enacted the offensive measure (a measure
which was in violation of international law), the facts and decisions in
this case show such interpretation to be unwarranted. If we apply our
formula of measurement to this case, we shall find that the Dutch courts
handed down a decision in no way inconsistent with decisions of United
States courts which support the act of state doctrine. Contrary to the
apparent belief of some, there was no issue whatever in this case con-
cerning title to property in the Netherlands.
Senembah, a Dutch company, claimed as its own, certain property in
the Netherlands. The Bank Indonesia, although a government institution
of Indonesia, appeared in this case only as a private bank doing a com-
mercial business ("in the capacity as a party to a contract of credit"ll),
claiming the right to continue to hold that property previously pledged
with it as collateral for a loan. The Bank Indonesia, the defendant in
this case, admitted that the property in controversy was the property of
Senembah, but subject to a pledge. The Bank Indonesia, as a bank, did
indeed desire to acquire that property, not that it claimed that title had
been transferred to it or to any government agency of Indonesia by Indo-
nesian law. It made no such claim. Not that the Bank denied the prop-
erty had been deposited with its branch in the Netherlands as property
125. The N.T.I.R. contains the principal parts, but not the whole, of each decision
of the lower court and the court of appeals. The original decision in the Dutch language has
been compared with the excerpts printed in English in the N.T.I.R., which are found to
be excellent translations. The English excerpts appearing in the Dutch Law Journal are,
therefore, relied upon as the authority in this case.
When the decision of the district court was published in part in 7 N.T.I.R. 2S5 (1960), the
editor's resume of the facts was incorrect. Later, in this same journal, in a note folloving the
court of appeals decision, the erroneous statement of facts was corrected. 7 N.T.IR. at 403.
The editor stated: "MSy attention has been drawn to the fact that owing to a very concise
report in the Nederlandse Jurisprudentie the statement of the facts of this case on pagen
285 and 286 . .. is not quite correct." (Italics omitted.)
126. 7 N.T..R. at 400.
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of Senembah. It demanded the right to retain the property solely on
the grounds that in the banking relations entered into between Bank
Indonesia and Senembah, Senembah still owed money ,to the Bank and,
therefore, the Bank demanded the right to continue to hold the property
as collateral. Senembah denied any debt then owing.
In this case the Dutch court properly decided that Indonesian law,
contrary to international law, was not effective outside of Indonesia, and
Netherlands courts would not enforce it in the Netherlands. To decide
otherwise would have supplanted Dutch law.
Before reciting the details of the case, certain misconceptions concern-
ing this case may be dealt with briefly. One erroneous idea is that the
property of which both Senembah and Bank Indonesia claimed posses-
sion, had been shipped to the Netherlands after confiscation and was
there claimed by Senembah. This would have been similar to the
Sabbatino case in which the sugar, after confiscation, was shipped to
the United States, but the facts in this Dutch case were otherwise. A
second misconception is that, because of the confiscation, some agency
of Indonesia was entitled to assert a claim of title to the property in the
Netherlands.
These two errors can be dealt with very briefly by the following quota-
tion-
"All six lots of tobacco had already been shipped to the Netherlands before the Act
on Nationalization of Netherlands Enterprises entered into force on December 31,
1958, and, with regard to the first two lots, even before the imposition of control,
which, according to the Bank Indonesia did not in any case affect the property rights
of Senembah.' 27
-and by reference to the date on which the decision of the district court
was made. This shows that the decision of the court of first instance was
prior to the time when the confiscation decree took effect. In short, the
property in the Netherlands had been brought to the Netherlands by
Senembah as its own property before the confiscation decree went into
effect, and the case was decided before confiscation.
In further consideration of errors, it must be noted that a bureau of
control had been set up in Indonesia to take over and administer the
assets of Senembah, and some have felt that this Dutch case was an effort
by the Indonesian Government to secure these assets extraterritorially.
Such, however, was not the case as is easily shown by -the fact that there
was no agency of the Government of Indonesia in the case whatever, since
the Bank Indonesia appeared only as a private bank.
A recital of the facts, not set forth in any of the opinions of the United
States courts in Sabbatino, will prevent misinterpretation of this case.
127. Id. at 403. (Italics omitted.)
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Facts. Senembah, the plaintiff, was a Dutch corporation which held several
estates in Indonesia for the cultivation of tobacco. Bank Indonesia, the de-
fendant, before the events of the case had been nationalized, but appeared in
the case only as a private bank. On September 10, 1956, and before the In-
donesian Government had taken measures against Dutch industry in Indonesia,
Senembah secured a loan from Bank Indonesia in the Netherlands (not in
Madan, Indonesia as at first was erroneously reported). This was an ordinary
commercial loan but payable in local currency in Indonesia. As collateral for
this loan, Senembah pledged a large number of bales of tobacco warehoused
in Indonesia, the warrants (receipts) for which were held by Bank Indonesia
in Indonesia. In addition, Senembah pledged, also as collateral, another and
different lot of tobacco which was warehoused in the Netherlands, the warrants
for which were held in the Netherlands by the Netherlands branch of the Bank
Indonesia.
In 1957, sometime after this loan had been made, the Indonesian Govern-
ment commenced oppressive, coercive measures against Dutch enterprises in
Indonesia and established government control over all Dutch companies there.
(This was before the measure for the confiscation of Dutch properties. In fact,
the case here discussed was actually decided-not merely commenced-before
Indonesian confiscation measures became effective against Dutch property in
Indonesia. Thus, any reference to this case as proof of refusal to recognize
transfer of title under a confiscation decree must be based on a misunder-
standing of the facts, and particularly of the facts involving dates.) The
Indonesian Government set up a special government bureau (referred to in
the case as PPN-Baru) for the purpose of exercising control over Dutch
properties in Indonesia, and an Indonesian official from this bureau was placed
in charge of the business of Senembah in Indonesia. After this event, no
officials of the Senembah company had any control whatever over any of
its properties, management, or the purchase or sale of tobacco from these
estates. It was these measures that the Dutch courts found were contrary to
international law and were a prelude to confiscation. The Indonesian Gov-
ernment at this time did not claim title to any of the Senembah properties
in Indonesia or to any in The Netherlands.
At the time of the institution of this "control" over the Senembah properties
in Indonesia, the loan account between Senembah and the Bank Indonesia
stood as follows: Senembah owed Bank Indonesia 50,859,440 Indonesian
rupiahs against which the Bank Indonesia held collateral security of 3,476
bales of tobacco warehoused in Indonesia and an additional amount ware-
housed in The Netherlands.
The Indonesian controller of Senembah made an agreement with the Bank
Indonesia to deliver to him all of the pledged tobacco held by that bank
in Indonesia. The controller then sold the collateral and received payment of
more than 51,000,000 Indonesian rupiahs, more than enough to pay off the
loan against which they had been pledged. The debt was then further increased,
although this had not been authorized by Senembah.
Sometime after the transactions just described had been completed in In-
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donesia, the Senembah company in The Netherlands, considering that its loan
to Bank Indonesia had been fully satisfied by the liquidation of its collateral
pledged in Indonesia, desired to repossess the collateral deposited as excess
collateral with the Bank Indonesia in The Netherlands. It wished to use
this to satisfy a contract it had made. Not receiving the pledged warrants,
Senembah sued the Bank Indonesia in The Netherlands to get back this
property, which was also in The Netherlands, and the title to which was
admitted even by the Bank Indonesia not .to have been affected by the "con-
trol" of Senembah's property in Indonesia.
Contention and Decision. The court in The Netherlands first ordered the In-
donesian Bank in The Netherlands to deliver the warrants to De Twentsche
Bank, to be held by that latter bank pending determination by the court of
the respective rights of Senembah and Bank Indonesia. De Twentsche Bank
had no other connection with the case.
The Bank Indonesia answered the complaint and counterclaimed against
Senembah. To the indignant astonishment of the Dutch court, the Bank In-
donesia claimed that Senembah must deliver the tobacco in The Netherlands
to it, because it was required to do so.
It has been shown already that this claim was not because Indonesia
had confiscated Dutch properties and claimed the right to the tobacco.
No such claim was made. And as shown, the case was decided before the
confiscatory Indonesian laws came into effect. The action of Indonesia
which was declared to be contrary to international law was the imposition
of this control-the PPN-Baru. The claim, therefore, must be related
back to that particular act of state and to no other. Under this there could
have been but two claims:
(1) that by Indonesian law, Senembah, a Dutch company doing busi-
ness in Indonesia, was obligated by Indonesian law to turn over tobacco
to Indonesia. Senambah's position was that
"the control over its estates in Indonesia by the Indonesian authorities and all acts
of administration of the PPN-Baru, the organ delegated by the Indonesian authorities
to exercise the control, do not concern Senembah and lack legal force because they
are contrary to international law.' 28
Of course they had no validity in The Netherlands. That would have
been to grant extraterritoriality to Indonesian law. However, Bank Indo-
nesia claimed, under its own interpretation of the act of state doctrine, as
follows:
"The Bank Indonesia, referring to the 'Act of State' doctrine, alleges that, according
to international law, the legality of the control over the Senembah estates and of
the administration carried out by the PPN-Baru cannot be questioned, since Nether-
128. Id. at 400. (Italics omitted.) The question here was not whether they had legal force
in Indonesia, but whether they had legal force in The Netherlands as claimed by Bank
Indonesia.
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lands courts, being foreign courts vdth regard to the Indonesia State organs, are
not entitled to review their acts."'1-
(2) With all other possibilities eliminated, the defense of the Bank
Indonesia could have been nothing more than an effort to recover a debt
which under the laws of Indonesia it claimed was still due and owing.
What the Bank Indonesia was asking The Netherlands court to do was in
effect to recognize as still outstanding and owing a debt of Senembah, the
collateral for which had been taken over pursuant to Indonesian law, and
to enforce such an obligation in The Netherlands. It claimed that this was
mere "recognition" of the laws of Indonesia, which in this case were con-
trary to the laws of The Netherlands and contrary to commercial law
generally. The very peculiarity of this claim on laws contrary to interna-
tional law is probably the reason for the confusion in its interpretation.
Decision. Of course, the lower court in The Netherlands rejected this plea of the
Bank Indonesia. Thereupon, Bank Indonesia appealed. The very statement
of the grounds on which this appeal was prosecuted is sufficient to show that
Bank Indonesia desired to have enforced in The Netherlands Indonesian law
violently at variance with the commercial law of The Netherlands and other
commercial countries, and that any alleged obligation which Bank Indonesia
claimed would be, under the laws of any other country except Indonesia,
wholly fictitious; Senembah had no obligation in The Netherlands to deliver
more tobacco warrants to Bank Indonesia. The grounds of Bank Indonesia's
appeal were:
"The President [of the Dutch court of first instance] wrongly reviewed the control
over the Senembah estates in Indonesia and was wrongly of the opinion that this
control is contrary to a) international law, b) the concepts of morality prevailing in
The Netherlands and c) the provisions of the Netherlands Commercial Code regu-
lating the management of limited companies and applicable to Senembah."'9
The court affirmed the decision of the lower court and directed delivery of
the warrants to Senembah.
It is perhaps unfortunate that the courts of The Netherlands rejected
this outrageous claim so summarily without giving detailed reason why,
in the court's opinion, the obligations of Senembah to the Bank Indonesia
had been fully satisfied. Perhaps the court thought that they were too
obvious to recite. The spectacle of two government agencies of the same
government-one, the official of the "control"; the other, the fiscal agent
of the government--conniving with each other about collateral pledged
for a loan, and then for the fiscal agent to appear in The Netherlands as
a private bank and claim that it had not been paid, or for other reasons
under Indonesian law had a right to secure some property of Senembah
129. Id. at 400-01. (Italics omitted.)
130. Id. at 400.
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in The Netherlands, was too much for any court to take calmly. One
needs scarcely go deeper into the commercial relations than that or
observe that when the collateral was handed over in Indonesia, the Bank
Indonesia had a security title to it. No bank may sue without recourse
to the collateral, unless it is immediately prepared to deliver the collateral
upon payment, which, of course, the Indonesian bank was not prepared
to do, for it had already been sold. Also, Senembah, under commercial
law, would have had a counterclaim for the full amount for which the
Government of Indonesia, through the Bank Indonesia, sued. By the
sale of the collateral through its control, Indonesia had been unjustly
enriched in that amount. Bank Indonesia had no right to the collateral
never in its possession, except under Netherlands law as collateral for
a loan then fully paid.
The only connection which this case has with the act of state doctrine
is in relation to extraterritoriality. What the Indonesian Bank asked the
courts of The Netherlands to do was to recognize that, under the laws
of Indonesia, Senembah still owed the bank, and then to enforce that lia-
bility under the laws of The Netherlands, thus permitting the Indonesian
Bank to collect the same debt twice and some more in addition. This
same unfair result would have been achieved by recognizing an extra-
territorial power to the "control" if it had made claim to the property.
L. The German Cases
The Senembah case has been paired with a certain German case, pre-
sumably to show an opposite result. However, the two cases are not com-
parable. The Dutch case was decided before confiscation; the German case
was decided after the Indonesian confiscation decrees.
28. N.V. Verenigde Deli-Maatschappijen v. Deutsch-Indonesische
Tabak-Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H., Dist. Ct. Breman, April 13, 1959,
aff'd, Ct. App. Breman, Aug. 21, 1959, [1963] Int. L. Rep. 16
(Ger.).
Cited in the Sabbatino decisions, this German case is classified as one
in which the courts recognized the validity of an act of state. Since the
case indeed does support that proposition and has been correctly cited
for what it actually holds, only brief discussion of it is necessary.
Facts. As shown in the previous case, control of Dutch enterprises in Indonesia
began in 1957 and ended with confiscation of those properties on December 31,
1958. From the time the "control" governed the operations of the Estates
formerly operated by the Dutch companies, this "control" took over the mar-
keting of the tobacco grown on those Estates which had either been the
property of Dutch-owned companies, or were included in concessions granted
by the Indonesian Government to the Dutch for the purpose of raising tobacco.
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The "control" determined not to attempt to market tobacco through the
Netherlands which had been the normal trade route for tobacco grovwn in
the Dutch East Indies by Dutch companies, but sought to establish instead
a market in Germany. Tobacco from these Indonesian Estates sent by the
"control" was claimed in Germany by the Dutch companies. One of these
companies was the Senembah company, which figured in the previous case.
These companies claimed a continuing ownership on the grounds that the
Indonesian "control" was contrary to international law and that the marketing
agents of Indonesia did not have the right to possession of the tobacco, nor
did they have title.
The original decision in this case was April 13, 1959, at which time the
confiscation decrees had been put into effect in Indonesia.
Decision. The German courts in deciding these claims recognized the validity
of the "control" over the property in Indonesia, and that under the confisca-
tion decrees title had been acquired by these Indonesian acts of state.
Several other German cases are cited in the Sabbatino opinions.
29. Confiscation of Property of Sudeten Germans, Amtsgericht of Din-
golfing, Dec. 7, 1948, [1948] Ann. Dig. 24 (No. 12) (Ger., Amer.
Zone) .131
This case, cited by the district court, the court of appeals and in the
dissenting Supreme Court opinion in the Sabbatino case, involves two
refugee women deported as enemies and a disputed title to a sewing
machine. The case was decided by the local court in the Bavarian town
of Dingolfing, and it was never appealed to the next higher court in
Munich.
The incident from which the case arose occurred in those difficult days
following the cessation of hostilities of World War II when Nazi control
of Czechoslovakia ceased and Benes came in as titular head of the
Czechoslovakian Government under Allied sponsorship. Shortly there-
after, the Benes government promulgated the Decree of October 25, 1945,
which recognized the Sudeten Germans as enemies, as, of course, they
had been since Hitler took over the Sudetenland in 1938 and a year later
the whole of Czechoslovakia. Under this decree the Sudeten Germans
were to be deported from Czechoslovakia as enemies and their property
forfeited to the state. Moreover, under this decree, the Sudeten Germans
were placed in various concentration camps to await actual deportation
to Germany. The incident of the sewing machine occurred in one of these
camps.
Facts. Two women, both enemy nationals resident in Czechoslovakia and both
131. The original decision is not officially reported, "unveraffentliclt," but was reported
in full by Professor Gunther Beitzke, University of Gattingen, in 15 Zeitschrift fur Aus-
landisches und Internationales Privatrecht 141-48 (1949).
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dressmakers or seamstresses, were taken to a concentration camp as the prelim-
inary step in their deportation to Germany. Both brought their sewing ma-
chines along with them to the camp, and both had these taken from them
as they entered. One of the women, before leaving the camp, asked to have her
sewing machine given back to her, and a sewing machine was given to her, but
it was not the one she had had before. Nevertheless, she brought this machine
from Czechoslovakia into Germany. The other woman likewise arrived in
Germany, but without a sewing machine. However, she recognized the sewing
machine of the other woman as the one she herself had had and had been
obliged to give up as she entered the camp, and she claimed it as hers before
the local court of Dingolfing.
Lack of information as to one very important fact was acknowledged by
the judge trying the case, but he obviously did not recognize the possible
ramifications of the case resulting from his lack of knowledge. He was not
sure whether the State of Czechoslovakia had taken title or tried to take
title to this sewing machine under the law of October 25, 1945. He thought
that depriving these women of their personal property upon entering the
camp might have been a wilful act of the guards of the camp. Curiously, the
judge hought this of no importance, though had it been merely the act of a
guard, the whole controversy would be removed from the realm of international
considerations. The wrongful and unauthorized act of a prison guard would
not transfer title. The conclusion that the Government did not intend to
confiscate this machine is strengthened by the fact that both women were al-
lowed to bring their sewing machines to camp with them and that, upon the
request of one of them, a machine was returned to her to take with her to
Germany. If the machine had been the property of the Czechoslovakian Gov-
ernment under a confiscation decree, then the guard at the camp embezzled or
stole state property when he returned a machine to the woman who asked for it.
Also, a sewing machine would be somewhat difficult to conceal if wrongfully
in her possession when the woman left the camp. There was no evidence in
the case that the Government of Czechoslovakia claimed this machine or that
the woman who brought it into Germany claimed that she had title from the
Government of Czechoslovakia. Certainly, she was not a bona fide innocent
purchaser for value, for she paid nothing for the machine at the camp, but
took it as a replacement for the one she had been obliged to turn in. There
is also no evidence in the case that the other woman who came from the
camp into Germany without a sewing machine (the claimant) had made any
request to the guards for the return of her sewing machine before she left.
Contention and Decision. The judge ordered the delivery of the sewing ma-
chine to the original owner, not the woman who had brought it into Germany.
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about this case is that a court in
the year 1948 in Germany, a country occupied by foreign powers as
conquerors, could ignore the terms of unconditional surrender of Ger-
many, could ignore the fact that Czechoslovakia was recognized by the
Allies as a country occupied by the enemy Hitler from the commence-
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ment of the war and that the Allies drove the Nazi forces from Czechoslo-
vakia, could ignore the fact that the Nazi Government no longer existed
and that the Government of Germany at that time was the Allies, and
could ignore the terms of the Postdam Conference and the Paris Repara-
tions Agreement, and the laws imposed by the Allied occupation.
If we accept as our premise the Dingolfing judge's statement of facts
of the case and the inference from them as found by this judge, then the
case would have been decided by United States courts as this case was
decided. But if we repudiate the world of fantasy created by the judge
of the Dingolfing court and add facts important to the case which he
ignored, we may be surprised to find that under this decision the treat-
ment of Germany by the Allies and the retention of external German
assets as reparations was wholly contrary to the law of nations and should
have been ignored, not only by Germany but throughout the world.
As to the decision on the facts as given by the judge, and applying
our yardstick as to what United States courts would have done, we may
say (1) that there was no evidence in this case that Czechoslovakia had
assumed title to the sewing machine. If there was no change of title, the
original ownership of course continued. (2) If the seizure was merely that
of a conquering country of the property of the citizens of that country,
it was governed by the Hague Convention, and again the decision would
have been correct. (3) The German Government did not recognize,
as the government of the area, the Czechoslovakian Government, newly
reestablished in its own territory after having been left in exile during
hostilities; and only a recognized government can create an act of state.
Only (1) above could be true in this case. Under the Paris Reparations
Agreement, the Allies took all property of Germans outside of Germany in
lieu of reparations; and as to (3), of course, the Allies in occupation of
Germany recognized Czechoslovakia as the legitimate government of the
area.
The German court of Dingolfing, however, elected to treat this case
as an act of state of a confiscating government, and the taking of the
sewing machine in Czechoslovakia as an act against the law of nations.
The Sudeten Germans, the judge finds, were a national minority, and as
such "a special subject of the law of nations." He finds no difference
between confiscations of non-enemies and seizure of enemy property-
both he decided here were against the law of nations. He finds that
although the German Government did unlawful acts against the Czechoslo-
vakian state, the seizure of property of Germans was excessive as re-
taliation (reparation). He defends the Hitler Government: "'The Nazi
State did not... drive all Czechs and Slovaks from their homes merely
on the ground of their national allegiance, nor did it deprive them of
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their property without compensation.' ,,1"' But he omits any reference
to the treatment of the Jewish population and the fact that confiscation
of the property of large numbers of Czechs and Slovaks was accom-
plished to create estates which were given to collaborators. He determined
that the act was merely against German speaking persons, not recognizing
that these persons had been the cause of the attack on and occupation of
Czechoslovakia, and they were expelled, not because they spoke German,
but because they were enemy. He finds the sewing machine was taken by
a decree contrary to the law of nations, the Constitution of Germany,
public policy and above all
"the questionable decree also constitutes a violation of Natural Law which applies
over all state power and which is also recognized in Article 30 E.G.B.G.B. [German
civil code]."' 33
If more were needed to discredit this case than is inherent in the
decision itself, we may find it in the laws of Allied Occupation. By Con-
trol Council Law No. 5 of 1945, which was prior to the decision, the
occupying powers removed all German external assets from the control of
the German owners by vesting title to them in the German External
Property Commission, composed of representatives of the Four Powers,
excepting only assets located within the territory of the United States,
United Kingdom, France and the U.S.S.R. This was in accord with the
Potsdam agreement of August 1945. Later, on September 5, 1951, the
Council of the Allied High Commission enacted Law No. 63 clarifying
the status of German external assets and other property taken by way
of reparation or restitution. Directed specifically to situations in which
seized German property would enter Germany, the Allied Government
stated:
[I]t appeared desirable to protect all persons who had acquired German assets,
taken as reparations, as well as the owners of restituted property, from any risk of
having to defend their title against attack by former German owners if such property
should be brought into Germany, no matter how remote such risk, and how devoid of
a legal basis such attack might appear.' 34
It would be easy to dismiss this case as one which, because of its
very nature and of the type of opinions given, would be a precedent for
132. [1948] Ann. Dig. at 26.
133. Id. at 25. In the original this reads: "Das Fragliche Dekret stellt auch eine Verletzung
des Naturrechts dar, das iiber aller Staatsgewalt gilt und das audi in Art. 30 EGBGB
anerkannt ist." Supra note 131, at 144.
Article 30, referred to frequently in German cases in this field, is the Article referring to
Public Order, i. e. preservation of the right to private property within Germany. See Prince
Dabischa-Kotromaniez v. Socidt Lepke, p. 669 infra.
134. Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, 8th Quarterly Report
on Germany 55 (1951).
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nothing. But the decision is of importance for two reasons. In the first
place it is the only decision which expresses the view set forth in une-
quivocal language in the district court and court of appeals opinions
in Sabbatino that something, whether it be called "international
law" or "natural law" is a limitation on sovereignty; and that limitation
can be imposed against any country (which of course must include the
United States) by any court anywhere in the world. The district court
in Sabbatino said:
There is an end to the right of national sovereignty when the sovereign's acts impinge
on international law.' 35
The correlative statement of the court of appeals states:
[T]he very proposition that something known as international law exists carries with
it the implication that national sovereignty is not absolute but is limited, where
the international law impinges, by the dictates of this international law.'26
The lower courts in the Sabbatino case also said:
The effective method to promote adherence to the standards imposed by international
law is to enforce these standards in municipal courts, particularly in view of the
poverty and inadequacy of international remedies. 137
But until the day of capable international adjudication among countries, the muni-
cipal courts must be the custodians of the concepts of international law, and they must
expound, apply and develop that law whenever they are called upon to do so.'33
The second reason for the importance of this German decision is that
the United States, in its brief in Sabbatino, pointed out that United States
courts should not refuse recognition to Foreign acts of state; nor are their
pronouncements affecting American nationals likely to be accepted in
other countries as impartial determinations of international issues. Here
we have a decision so unimportant in Germany that it has never been
officially published; a decision written by a judge who sat in a local court
in the little Bavarian town of Dingolfing; a decision unappealed. There
was no appeal court there. The resulting decision is what one may expect
when matters of international import are entrusted to local nationalistic
judges, careless of the facts, indifferent to history, and ignore the law.
Examination of German cases cited among the thirty-two foreign
court decisions cited by the three United States courts in Sabbalino will
show that higher German courts both before and after the decision in
the Sudeten German case supported the act of state doctrine without an
exception.
135. 193 F. Supp. at 3S1.
136. 307 F.2d at S60.
137. 193 F. Supp. at 382.
138. 307 F.2d at 861.
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30. Czechoslovak Confiscatory Decree Case, Ct. App. Nuremberg, Sept.
19, 1949, [1949] Ann. Dig. 19 (No. 10) (Ger., Amer. Zone).
Facts. The appellant, had been convicted of conversion of certain valuables
entrusted to her by a German national, who had been domiciled in Czechoslo-
vakia but was evicted under the laws requiring persons of German nationality
to leave Czechoslovakia. Before leaving for Germany, the German national
entrusted these valuables to the appellant, asking her to bring them to Ger-
many and give them back to him there.
In her defense in the court of appeals in Germany, the appellant contended
her conviction should be quashed because the original owner of the valuables
could not claim the right of ownership. She based this conclusion on the fact
that at the time when the German entrusted the valuables to her, the confisca-
tion law of Czechoslovakia against Germans had already been passed, re-
quiring that they deliver their valuables to Czechoslovakian authorities. The
German did not do this but gave the property to her to hold, contrary to the
Czechoslovakian law. She argued, further, that the real owner was the state
of Czechoslovakia, to which the German should have given the property. She
claimed that since the crime (his or hers) had been committed against the
State of Czechoslovakia, the German courts had no jurisdiction. In short,
she had committed no crime whatever against the man who had entrusted
the property to her since the title was already in the state of Czechoslovakia.
Decision and Contention. The court rejected the appellant's defense. All one
can say about this defense is that it was ingenious and a desperate last chance
based upon a proposition of law recognized neither by Germany nor by the
United States.
The unsoundness of this proposition of law can be shown by the answer
to two questions. (1) Does a person against whose property a confiscation law
is directed have a duty to deliver all of his property to the confiscating au-
thority? Within the territory of the confiscating government, he has, under
its laws, that obligation, and the confiscating government will try to seize
the property or punish if he is caught. If, however, he can arrange for his
property to elude that confiscating government, no other government will
seize that property and deliver it to that foreign government which has at-
tempted confiscation. (2) Does a foreign government by confiscatory decree
acquire title to property which it has never had in its possession? No country
recognizes the acquisition of title by confiscation of another country unless
accompanied by jurisdiction and control.
This decision does not represent any question of law inconsistent with
United States law and procedure. If the United States subscribed to that
doctrine which the appellant pleaded as her defense, it would mean that
the United States would require that the property of every refugee who
fled his country-whether it be Russia, Germany, China, Cuba-because
of confiscatory decrees be delivered back to the government of the
country from which he came.
[Vol. 33
ACT OF STATE
'What proposition of law contrary to the United States adherence to
the act of state doctrine this case was intended to illustrate is not appa-
rent.
31. Prince Dabischa-Kotromaniez v. Sociltg Lepke, Tribunal of Berlin,
Nov. 1, 1928, 56 Clunet 184 (1929) (Ger.).
The case of Prince Dabisclia-Kotromanicz v. Socigt Lepke is similar
to the English case of Princess Paley Olga v. We"isz and the French case
of De Keller v. Maison de la Pensge Francaise. In all three cases, the
problem to be solved by the courts, the law applied and the results were
the same; all three cases supported the act of state doctrine.
Facts. Prince Dabischa-Kotromaniez had owned some art in Russia which had
been seized by the Soviet Government. This art appeared in an auction in
Berlin and was claimed by the Prince.
Decision and Contention. The court denied his claim of title to the property,
finding that by the confiscatory laws of Russia and the seizure of the property,
Russia had acquired title. In this case article Number 30 of the introduction
to the German Civil Code was pleaded. This was to the effect that in Germany
property may not be seized without adequate compensation. The contention
was that since there was no compensation, German courts should not recognize
change of title. This plea was rejected, the court saying:
"This article [Art. 30], however, does not permit us to criticize an act of sov-
ereignty that the Government of a foreign state takes against one of its citizens,
particularly when this Government, as is the case NJith the Russian government, is
recognized by Germany...
"It is then impossible, according to German law, by application of article 30 of the
law of introduction, to refuse to recognize the effect of the transfer of o-nership
effected on Russian territory, in conformity with the provisions of Russian law, and
therefore impossible to admit on this basis the claim of the former owners." 1
M. The Austrian Case
32. Hungarian Soviet Government, Sup. Ct., Oct. 31, 1922, (1922]
4 E.O.G.Z. 274 (No. 10), [1919-1922] Ann. Dig. 56 (No. 31)
(Aus.).
This case was the only one of Austrian courts cited in any of the
Sabbatbo decisions in regard to the act of state. The report of the case in
the Commercial Court of Vienna and the decision of the Supreme Court
(Court of Appeals) of Austria is given below as the report of these two
decisions can be found in the Annual Digest.
Facts. "The Hungarian Soviet Government seized, by Decree of 17, June 1919,
the securities and deposits in Hungarian banks. It then sold part of these effects
to a certain L.F., a merchant in Vienna. The owners contested the validity of
139. 56 Clunet at 1S4-S5.
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the purchase and brought an action asking for a declaration that they were
the owners. The Commercial Court of Vienna decided that the purchase was
valid, as the effects were sold by the Hungarian Soviet Government, as that
Government exercised at that time power in Hungary, and as the Austrian
Government recognised and entertained relations with the Hungarian Govern-
ment. The fact that no compensation was paid was irrelevant. The Upper Dis-
trict Court of Vienna confirmed the judgment of the Court below.
"Held by the Supreme Court: That the decisions of the Courts below must be
affirmed. The Soviet Government in Hungary was recognised by the Austrian
Government, and it had an accredited representative with that Government. It
follows that the decrees of the Soviet Government in Hungary are governmental
acts which the Austrian Republic must recognise. The question whether the
Allied Powers recognised the Hungarian Government is irrelevant, seeing that
the purchase was made in Vienna. The decrees of the Hungarian Government
which succeeded the Soviet Government and which declared the acts of the
latter to be null and void cannot affect the acquired rights of third persons."1 40
The Austrian court recognized the validity of the Russian decrees and,
therefore, the transfer of title pursuant to those decrees.
HICKENLOOPER AMENDMENT, 78 Stat. 1013 (1964), 22 U.S.C.A.
§ 2370(e)(2) (Supp. 1964).
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United
States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine
to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the principles of
international law in a case in which a claim of title or other right is
asserted by any party including a foreign state (or a party claiming
through such state) based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or
other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation of
the principles of international law, including the principles of compensa-
tion and the other standards set out in this subsection: Provided, That
this subparagraph shall not be applicable (1) in any case in which an act
of a foreign state is not contrary to international law or with respect to a
claim of title or other right acquired pursuant to an irrevocable letter
of credit of not more than 180 days duration issued in good faith prior
to the time of the confiscation or other taking, or (2) in any case with
respect to which the President determines that application of the act of
state doctrine is required in that particular case by the foreign policy
interests of the United States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on
his behalf in that case with the court, or (3) in any case in which the
proceedings are commenced after January 1, 1966."
140. [1919-1922] Ann. Dig. at 56-57.
